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INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2021, Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
Chairman Gary Gensler specifically told a global conference on crypto that
Congress needed to “give the agency more authority to better police
cryptocurrency trading, lending and platforms, a ‘Wild West’ he said is
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riddled with fraud and investor risk.”1 He has repeated these themes multiple
times, including in testimony at hearings before the House Financial Services
and House Appropriations Committees.2 In addition, on September 14, 2021,
when he testified before the Senate Banking Committee, he reported that
“clarity is needed from Congress on how the federal regulatory agencies can
work together on crypto issues.”3 Gensler has repeatedly been quoted as
having complained that crypto lending is so underregulated that it is still like
the “Wild West.”4
The desire for congressional clarification, particularly with regard to the
scope of the SEC’s authority, but also how that authority relates to power that
has been delegated to other regulators, has long been shared by others in the
crypto ecosystem.5 Timothy Massad, former chairman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and former Assistant Secretary for
Financial Stability at the Treasury, explained in 2019 that “[t]here is a gap in

1. Katanga Johnson, U.S. SEC Chair Gensler Calls on Congress to Help Rein in Crypto ‘Wild
West,’ REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2021, 6:43 PM), https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-sec-chairgensler-calls-congress-help-rein-crypto-wild-west-2021-08-03/.
2. Katelynn Bradley, Annmarie Conboy-DePasquale & Travis Norton, SEC Chair Gensler
Signals Greater Regulation of Cryptocurrency Under Existing Authorities, BROWNSTEIN (Sept. 21,
2021),
https://www.bhfs.com/insights/alerts-articles/2021/sec-chair-gensler-signals-greaterregulation-of-cryptocurrency-under-existing-authorities [https://perma.cc/LLA6-C9GB]. Gary
Gensler’s testimony from a May 6, 2021, hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services
included the fact that he had already affirmatively asked his staff “to consider whether expanded
enforcement mechanisms are necessary” to deal with rapid changes in financial markets. Game
Stopped? Who Wins and Loses When Short Sellers, Social Media, and Retail Investors Collide, Part
III Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 117th Cong. 1 (2021) (testimony of Gary Gensler,
Chairman,
SEC),
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-117-ba00-wstategenslerg-20210506.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6GG-YQ4V]. On May 26, 2021, in his opening
statement before a House subcommittee, Chairman Gensler not only made the case for expanded
resources for the SEC but specifically called our regulatory gaps applicable to crypto exchanges,
commenting that was “just one of many regulatory gaps in these crypto asset markets.” Securities
and Exchange Commission Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t
U.S. House Appropriations Comm., 117th Cong. 8 (2021) (testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman,
SEC),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP23/20210526/112692/HHRG-117-AP23-BioGenslerG-20210526.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVS4-W585]. With regard to crypto regulation in
particular, he also noted that he looked forward to working “with Congress to fill in the gaps of
investor protection in these crypto markets.” Id. at 9.
3. Ted Knutson, SEC Chair Gensler: Crypto Assets Are Catalyst for Change but Need Greater
Oversight,
FORBES
(Sept.
14,
2021,
1:36
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tedknutson/2021/09/14/sec-chair-gensler-crypto-assets-are-catalystfor-change-but-need-greater-oversight/?sh=28af4c462f74 [https://perma.cc/H8DQ-95FF].
4. Regulators Face ‘Wild West’ as Crypto Traders Compete with Traditional Banks, NEWS24
(Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/regulators-face-wild-west-as-cryptotraders-compete-with-traditional-banks-20210917 [https://perma.cc/6P6H-D78X].
5. Tomio Geron, Washington Is Rushing to Regulate Crypto. It’s a Mess, PROTOCOL (May
20,
2021),
https://www.protocol.com/fintech/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-regulations
[https://perma.cc/6NK5-7934] (noting that “a substantial number of players in the crypto industry
have been seeking more regulatory clarity”).
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the regulation of crypto-assets that Congress needs to fix.”6 His report
concluded that cryptoassets cut across jurisdictional boundaries of the SEC
and CFTC, and that neither agency has sufficient jurisdiction to address the
risks that they present.7
Other observers have also bemoaned the lack of congressional action to
clarify how these new assets should be regulated. As one commentator has
noted: “Over the last decade, digital assets and blockchain technology have
developed from a fringe interest to a top concern of central banks and other
financial institutions. But cryptocurrency remains underutilized and poorly
understood. In the United States, this failure is symptomatic of congressional
neglect.”8
Notwithstanding apparent widespread agreement that existing laws and
regulatory structures are unclear, SEC Chair Gensler has recently pivoted
from this position, apparently deciding that the SEC can use a “broad”
definition of what constitutes a security, giving the agency a “great deal of
authority” while simultaneously providing “a great deal of clarity.”9 A review
of SEC enforcement actions, however, reveals a number of times when this
approach seems to have lacked the regulatory clarity necessary for proper
functioning of the capital markets.10
In order to explain how the SEC has, in effect, been regulating by
enforcement and to illustrate the problems with this approach while
advocating for a legislative response, this Article is divided into five Parts
and a conclusion. Part I of this Article offers a brief and high-level overview
of the development of cryptoassets and their functions, as well as associated
products that the SEC is claiming are securities. Part II offers an equally highlevel explanation of how such interests have generally been regulated in the
United States, with an emphasis on the test most often used by the SEC to

6. Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-assets, BROOKINGS
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/its-time-to-strengthen-the-regulation-ofcrypto-assets/ [https://perma.cc/3XV7-8WXH].
7. Id.
8. Craig Stevens, Congress Should Deliver Crypto Clarity and Reassert Its Authority, ROLL
CALL (Aug. 18, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://rollcall.com/2021/08/18/congress-should-deliver-cryptoclarity-and-reassert-its-authority/ [https://perma.cc/8US3-MJWN].
9. Bradley et al., supra note 2.
10. Consider this complaint about the current situation:
[R]ecent SEC guidance is primarily focused on how the agency will punish crypto entities
for violations, but it provides few tangible rules of the road for crypto players to follow
moving forward. This has a chilling effect on industry growth, as innovators may be
hesitant to operate in the United States for fear of unwittingly falling into the SEC’s
crosshairs.
Kristin Smith, Regulatory Clarity Will Ensure American Crypto Leadership, MORNING CONSULT
(Sept. 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/regulatory-clarity-will-ensureamerican-crypto-leadership/ [https://perma.cc/DZV5-SRN4].
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determine how the securities laws apply. Part III examines four distinct
instances that illustrate how the SEC’s approach to crypto has evolved and
some of the open questions causing confusion in the crypto ecosystem. Part
IV considers what it means for the SEC to be “regulating by enforcement”
and why that approach is suboptimal. Part V offers some suggestions of how
Congress might address the question of how cryptoassets should be
regulated. This Article concludes by determining that regulation by
enforcement is an inefficient and ineffective way to proceed, and that
congressional intervention is likely to be necessary to resolve the problems
that now exist in the crypto ecosystem.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CRYPTOASSETS
As has been discussed in considerably more detail elsewhere,11 the socalled blockchain era12 was launched in late 2008 when a person or persons
using the pseudonym “Satosohi Nakamoto” published a paper entitled
Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System in an online discussion of
cryptography.13 The initial or genesis transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain
occurred on January 3, 2009, when the first set of fifty Bitcoin (“BTC”) was
“mined.”14
11. There are a number of articles that do an admirable job of explaining the development and
operation of Bitcoin and other cryptoassets. See generally Georgios Dimitropoulos, The Law of
Blockchain, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1117 (2020); Shaanan Cohney et al., Coin-Operated Capitalism,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019); Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings Under
U.S. Law, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (2019); Christopher Burks, Note, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or
Breaking Barriers?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 244, 244–50 (2017). See also Mark Popielarski,
Blockchain Research: Bitcoins, Cryptocurrency, and Distributed Ledgers, 47 COLO. LAW., June
2018, at 10, for a list of additional resources describing the development and functioning of
cryptoassets. For persons wishing to gain a familiarity with some of the terminology in the crypto
space, see Carol Goforth, The Lawyer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About
Crypto-Transactions, 41 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47 (2019).
For a brief description of the development of crypto from a non-academic perspective, see
Anshu Siripurapu, Cryptocurrencies, Digital Dollars, and the Future of Money, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (Sept. 24, 2021, 12:55 PM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/cryptocurrenciesdigital-dollars-and-future-money [https://perma.cc/3YC2-NQUK]. An excellent explanation can
also be found at Andrey Sergeenkov, What Is Bitcoin?, COINDESK (Aug. 5, 2022, 1:39 PM),
https://www.coindesk.com/learn/what-is-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/DEA6-SMZE].
12. Although Bitcoin was the first to popularize the blockchain concept, blockchain technology
was first mentioned in 1991 by two mathematicians who were considering a system in which
document time stamps could not be tampered with. Adam Hayes, What Is a Blockchain?,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 24, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp.
13. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO
INST. (Oct. 31, 2008), https://nakamotoinstitute.org/bitcoin/.
14. “Mining” refers to the process by which cryptoassets using the proof of work consensus
protocol, such as Bitcoin, are created. In a proof of work system, before a block of proposed
transactions is added to the ledger, a computationally difficult problem must be solved. Computer
nodes wishing to serve as “miners” compete to be the first to solve the problem that is appended to
the block that they are verifying. The successful computer is rewarded with the automatic issuance
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Bitcoin has no centralized bank, nation state, or regulatory authority
backing it.15 Bitcoins have no tangible existence,16 and ownership is
demonstrated through complex cryptographic processes17 memorialized on a
distributed digital ledger. Bitcoins are issued and transferred according to
protocols established by an open-source computer program18 running
simultaneously on multiple computers. The program controls how the record
of transactions (including the issuance and all subsequent transfers) of each
Bitcoin or fraction thereof19 is maintained, with each computer (called

of new cryptoassets, which are said to be mined. For a more detailed explanation of crypto mining,
see Arya Taghdiri, The Cost of Innovation: Why Bitcoin Mining Requires International Regulation,
50 TEX. ENV’T L.J. 181, 183–84 (2020). For a more detailed explanation of the proof of work
consensus mechanism, see Lyle Daly, What Is Proof of Work (PoW) in Crypto?, MOTLEY FOOL
(June
28,
2022,
3:35
PM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/stock-market/marketsectors/financials/cryptocurrency-stocks/proof-of-work/ [https://perma.cc/7KYJ-8GWS].
15. Another way of saying this would be to explain that Bitcoin is decentralized. For an
explanation of the decentralization of blockchain technology, see Mally Anderson, Exploring
Decentralization: Blockchain Technology and Complex Coordination, J. OF DESIGN & SCI. (Feb.
18, 2019, 10:39 PM), https://jods.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/7vxemtm3/release/2.
16. As is the case for all cryptoassets, Bitcoins are really nothing more than a digitized
alphanumeric code memorialized on a blockchain. What Is a Cryptocurrency Token?,
CRYPTOCURRENCY FACTS, https://cryptocurrencyfacts.com/what-is-a-cryptocurrency-token/
[https://perma.cc/4CS8-R3QH] (last visited Aug. 5, 2022) (“[A] token is just string of numbers and
letters used in types of cryptography . . . .”).
17. Cryptography is used to ensure the security of the transactions, the privacy and ownership
rights of transaction participants, and the independence of operations from involvement of a
centralized intermediary. A very general introduction to the topic of cryptography as it relates to
cryptoassets can be found in Shobhit Seth, Explaining the Crypto in Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA
(May 15, 2022), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/explaining-crypto-cryptocurrency/. In the
context of cryptoassets, the most prevalent method of encryption involves an asymmetric encryption
cryptograph, which relies on public and private keys. The topic of how public key cryptography
functions to protect control over cryptoassets is far outside the scope of this Article. For those
interested in learning more about the topic, explanations can be found at Kirsty Moreland, What Are
Public
Keys
and
Private
Keys?,
LEDGER
ACAD.
(Sept.
23,
2022),
https://www.ledger.com/academy/blockchain/what-are-public-keys-and-private-keys, and What
Are
Public
and
Private
Keys?,
CRYPTOPEDIA
(June
28,
2022),
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/public-private-keys-cryptography [https://perma.cc/7AJZXVJ7].
18. While the Bitcoin programming is open-source, not all cryptoassets operate in this way.
Some blockchains are proprietary, and access requires permission from the owners. Shobhit Seth,
Public, Private, Permissioned Blockchains Compared, INVESTOPEDIA (July 28, 2022),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/public-private-permissioned-blockchains-compared/.
19. Bitcoins can be divided into fragments, with the smallest unit being called a “satoshi,” after
the name used by the creator of the asset. Jake Frankenfield, Satoshi, INVESTOPEDIA (July 14, 2022),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/satoshi.asp. One satoshi is equal to a 100 millionth of a
Bitcoin. Id.
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nodes)20 in the peer-to-peer network21 having full access to the digital ledger
of transactions (known as the blockchain). The record of transactions is called
a blockchain because transactions are aggregated together in “blocks” of data
before they are approved and added to the ledger in a “chain.”22
Crypto has evolved rapidly, increasing from a single such asset (Bitcoin)
in 2009 to more than 20,000 different cryptoassets as of August 5, 2022,
although many of those are inactive or have no appreciable value.23
Collectively, these assets are worth approximately one trillion dollars.24
Cryptoassets have also diversified in functionality, so that many of them are
no longer designed simply as a substitute for fiat currencies.25
Bitcoin was originally conceived of as a potential substitute for
conventional or “fiat” currency.26 Subsequent developments have permitted

20. For an explanation of nodes, see What Is a Blockchain Node and How Is It Used in
Cryptocurrency?,
GADGETS
360
(Aug.
21,
2021,
10:23
AM),
https://gadgets360.com/cryptocurrency/features/what-is-a-blockchain-node-how-doescryptocurrency-work-2515427 [https://perma.cc/T5DM-YL8D].
21. Bitcoin was founded, in part, on notions of democracy and equality, and therefore all
computers in the network are given equal access to each other, without the need for any centralized
authority or intermediary. Jake Frankenfield, Peer-to-Peer (Virtual Currency), INVESTOPEDIA
(Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ptop.asp (explicitly noting that a peer-topeer exchange was a primary goal for Bitcoin). Not all cryptoassets operate on a peer-to-peer basis.
Id.
22. What Is Blockchain Technology?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/topics/what-is-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/E9W9-S95Y] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022) (noting that “[a]s each transaction occurs,
it is recorded as a ‘block’ of data . . . . Each block is connected to the ones before and after it[.]
These blocks form a chain of data . . . .”).
23. Today’s
Cryptocurrency
Prices
by
Market
Cap,
COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/ [https://perma.cc/83GB-RQEM] (last visited Aug. 5, 2022) (the number
of cryptoassets is listed at 20,460 in the upper left-hand corner of the page).
24. Id. (listing the total value of all cryptoassets as of August 5, 2022, at
$1,088,319,737,603.93). This is substantially lower than the $3 trillion market capitalization that
was reached in November 2021. Crypto World Hits $3 Trillion Market Cap as Ether, Bitcoin Gain
in Trade, BUSINESS STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2021, 12:53 AM), https://www.businessstandard.com/article/international/crypto-world-hits-3-trillion-market-cap-as-ether-bitcoin-gainin-trade-121110900065_1.html.
25. Although Bitcoin was designed as a substitute for government-issued currency, cryptoassets
that are often called utility tokens now serve a variety of functions, providing access to a whole
range of services or goods within specific blockchain systems. Brian Nibley, What is a Utility
Token?, SOFI LEARN (Dec. 22, 2021), https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/what-is-a-utility-token/
[https://perma.cc/L6B4-Y3C7]; see also Bernard Marr, A Very Brief History of Blockchain
Technology Everyone Should Read, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/16/a-very-brief-history-of-blockchaintechnology-everyone-should-read/?sh=6aa885477bc4.
26. “The first generation of cryptocurrencies were designed as digital Stores of Value. Their
purpose was to replace fiat currency as the medium for transactions. . . . Bitcoin is the classic
example . . . .” Is Your Crypto Digital Gold, Gas, or Something Else?, STEEMIT (Aug. 12, 2017,
1:43 AM), https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@basiccrypto/is-your-crypto-digital-gold-gas-orsomething-else [https://perma.cc/483A-4BJ5]. For a further explanation of Bitcoin’s role as a
currency substitute, see Making Sense of Bitcoin, Cryptocurrency and Blockchain, PWC,
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new cryptoassets to utilize smart contract technology that gives some
cryptoassets additional functions.27 These new cryptoassets were often called
“utility tokens” to differentiate them from cryptoassets that served only as a
store of value, medium of exchange, or unit of account (the traditional
functions of money).28
Given that none of these cryptoassets were in existence prior to 2009, it
is not surprising that they were not in the contemplation of legislators and
regulators who enacted laws designed to protect financial markets and
systems, and members of the public who participate in or rely upon them.29
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financial-services/fintech/bitcoin-blockchaincryptocurrency.html [https://perma.cc/LC2T-7Z6U] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022). Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies can be contrasted with fiat currency because they are not issued or backed by any
government or central bank and generally have no status as legal tender. Inyoung Hwang, Fiat
Currencies: Defined, Explained, Compared to Cryptocurrencies, SOFI (June 1, 2022),
https://www.sofi.com/learn/content/fiat-currency/ [https://perma.cc/V4AN-B9HN].
27. The primary development facilitating such cryptoassets was the launch of the Ethereum
blockchain, although the idea of smart contracts predates even Bitcoin. What Are Smart Contracts
in Blockchain and How Do They Work?, COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/ethereum-forbeginners/what-are-smart-contracts-a-beginners-guide-to-automated-agreements
[https://perma.cc/H5AL-B64Z] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022).
28. For an explanation of the distinction between cryptoassets based on whether they serve only
as a currency substitute or whether they have additional utility, see Cryptopedia Staff, Digital
Assets:
Cryptocurrencies
vs.
Tokens,
CRYPTOPEDIA
(June
28,
2022),
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/cryptocurrencies-vs-tokens-difference
[https://perma.cc/KN43-923X]. The attributes of money are discussed in Swati Goyal, The
Difference Between Fiat Money and Cryptocurrencies, FX EMPIRE (Dec. 8, 2020, 7:44 AM),
https://www.fxempire.com/education/article/the-difference-between-fiat-money-andcryptocurrencies-520616 [https://perma.cc/R7L7-QWLP] (“[Price stability] allows fiat money to
act as a means of storing value and facilitating exchange. It can also be used to provide a numerical
account.”). It is also worth noting that utility tokens can be further divided, so that, for example, it
is possible to classify some of them as securities tokens either because they function as tokenized
versions of conventional securities or because they are marketed as speculative investments. For an
explanation of what security tokens are, see Cryptopedia Staff, What Are Security Tokens?,
CRYPTOPEDIA (June 21, 2021), https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/security-token-offering-vsinitial-coin-offering-stos [https://perma.cc/E689-26SS].
29. The primary federal securities laws, for example, were written in the 1930s, including the
Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78). See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/role-sec/laws-govern-securitiesindustry [https://perma.cc/PMD2-NWNF] (last visited Nov. 3, 2021). The most recent federal
legislation listed by the SEC as significantly changing the scope of the federal securities laws is the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, enacted on April 5, 2012. Id. This legislation
minimized regulatory requirements and did not address cryptoassets at all. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
The Commodities Exchange Act (“CEA”) was amended to create the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) in 1974. The history of the CFTC is set out in a series of links that
can be accessed from the agency’s webpage at The Commission, CFTC,
https://www.cftc.gov/About/AboutTheCommission (last visited Oct. 4, 2022). The most recent
legislative action affecting the CFTC’s jurisdiction occurred on July 21, 2010, when President
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to establish a comprehensive new regulatory
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In addition, both because of the speed with which the crypto ecosystem has
developed as well as the sheer bureaucracy and time required to promulgate
official regulations (much less major legislation), it is not surprising that for
the most part regulatory agencies have been forced to react to cryptoassets
by fitting them into existing laws and regulations.30 This has not resulted in
an ideal situation, either for regulators or for those trying to comply with legal
requirements.
II. CRYPTO REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding recently expressed opinions from some that crypto is
still the “Wild West,”31 that is not really an accurate assessment of the crypto
ecosystem. Cryptoassets may have operated under the legal radar for the first
few years of Bitcoin’s existence, but various aspects of the system have now
been regulated for more than a decade. For example, cryptocurrency
exchanges operating in the United States are required to operate under
requirements imposed by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”), pursuant to which they must adopt risk-based monitoring plans
and report a range of transactions that raise suspicions that the participants
are involved in money laundering or funding of illicit activities.32 Depending
on where they operate, such exchanges may also be required to comply with
state laws regulating money transmission33 and, in some cases, imposing
special requirements on virtual currency operations.34 The CFTC has also
framework for swaps and security-based swaps but did not touch on cryptoassets, which had not yet
risen to any level of prominence. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
30. To understand the problems faced by regulators in keeping up with rapid technological
innovation, see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2012); see also Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the
Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1273, 1312 (1991).
31. See supra notes 1, 4 and accompanying text.
32. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, GUIDANCE
ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING,
OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FinCEN 2013 Guidance],
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4GF6MMD].
33. While money transmitters are subject to FinCEN’s requirements at the federal level,
“individual states have the authority to administer and license money transmitters.” Susan Alkadri,
Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of
Exchange?, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 71, 82 (2018). By 2015, it appeared that “[m]ost states . . .
[had] taken positions on virtual currencies.” Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook,
Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON
REG. 495, 511 (2015).
34. The most onerous of those is probably the New York BitLicense requirement. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2022). Among other things, an applicant for a BitLicense must
provide extensive documentation, meet minimum capital and financial integrity standards, and
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claimed jurisdiction over crypto derivatives and their trading,35 as well as any
fraud occurring in the crypto “spot markets.”36 And the SEC itself has
pursued multiple enforcement actions against crypto issuers, promoters, and
others associated with various crypto transactions.37
To explain when they intend to regulate, these federal agencies, along
with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), have issued reports and guidance
comply with marketing and advertising restrictions. See generally The New York BitLicense: What
Is
It
and
Who
Needs
to
Have
One?,
CAPITAL
FUND
L.
BLOG,
https://www.capitalfundlaw.com/blog/newyorkbitlicense [https://perma.cc/8TXV-U7DW] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2022). The requirements associated with obtaining a BitLicense (needed for any
virtual currency business) are so stringent that the adoption of the requirement led to an exodus of
crypto businesses from the state. Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of Bitcoin Startups from
New York, FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015, 11:19 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startupsleave-new-york-bitlicense/ [https://perma.cc/75DE-T6C2]. Rhode Island also has an intensive
regulatory regime in place, having adopted the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of
Virtual-Currency Businesses Act. UNIF. REG. OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUS. ACT (UNIF. L.
COMM’N
2017),
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFile
Key=ca527d52-9bcf-15b0-b1c1-279b55b53fa4&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/Q6Q9-SC47];
see also Alan S. Kaplinsky & Dee Spagnuolo, Uniform Act to Regulate Virtual Currency Businesses
Ready
for
State
Adoption,
BALLARD
SPAHR
LLP
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.ballardspahr.com/insights/alerts-and-articles/2018/01/uniform-act-to-regulate-virtualcurrency-businesses-ready-for-state-adoption (describing the requirements of the Uniform
Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, including the proposed tier system for regulation).
Rhode Island adopted the Act in 2019. As of August 4, 2022, no other state had enacted the Act,
and California was the only state in which it had been introduced, and it was vetoed by the California
Governor on September 23. Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, ULC,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=e104aaa8-c10f45a7-a34a-0423c2106778 (last visited Oct. 4, 2022).
35. The first order from the CFTC imposing sanctions against a crypto-based business came in
2015.
In
re
Coinflip,
Inc.,
CFTC
No.
15-29
(Sept.
17,
2015),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ2N-8CHH]; accord In re BFXNA
Inc.,
CFTC
No.
16-19
(June
2,
2016),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfbfxnaorder060216.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD3K-3DDS].
36. For the first judicial opinion affirming the CFTC’s claims that cryptoassets should be
regulated as commodities, see CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(involving fraud in the spot or trading crypto markets), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321
F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). “Spot market” is a term frequently encountered in connection
with commodities regulation, and it refers to trades in the commodities themselves rather than
trading in futures or other derivatives. For more information about spot markets, see CFI Team,
Spot
Market,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.
(Feb.
12,
2022),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/spot-market/
[https://perma.cc/WG8A-V6C7].
37. A list of CFTC enforcement actions can be found at Enforcement Actions, CFTC,
https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/EnforcementActions/index.htm?year=all
[https://perma.cc/K3BW-JRZH] (last visited Oct. 4, 2022). While this list includes actions that do
not involve crypto or digital assets, it shows that, for example, fourteen crypto-based entities were
charged with failing to register or falsely claiming to be registered on September 29, 2021. Id. At
least ten other CFTC enforcement actions from 2021 alone involved cryptoasset operations of some
sort. Id.
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on how they interpret their authority and how they assert jurisdiction over
cryptoassets and crypto-based businesses. FinCEN issued its initial
explanation of how it intended to treat cryptoassets in 201338 and provided
additional details in 2019;39 the IRS issued an initial determination of how
cryptoassets should be treated for tax purposes in 2014;40 the CFTC issued a
primer in 2017, concluding that virtual currencies were commodities,
followed by a backgrounder issued in 2018, in turn followed by a second
primer in 2020;41 and the SEC explained the test it intended to use in
determining when crypto is a security in 2017,42 with numerous additional
details being set out in a “framework” issued by the SEC in 2019.43 These
authorities have laid the groundwork for cryptoassets to be regulated
simultaneously as a currency substitute (by FinCEN), as property (by the
IRS), as commodities (by the CFTC), and as securities (by the SEC).44 It is
beyond obvious that this state of affairs makes for an incredibly complex
regulatory situation,45 which does not equal an unregulated “Wild West.”

38. FinCEN 2013 Guidance, supra note 32.
39. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2019-G001,
GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS
INVOLVING
CONVERTIBLE
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
(2019),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/201905/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5JT-ZSBJ].
40. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb1416.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5DL-XBLB].
41. See LABCFTC, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2017),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/documents/file/labcftc_primercurrencies
100417.pdf [https://perma.cc/F65B-Z7LT]; CFTC, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF AND
APPROACH
TO
VIRTUAL
CURRENCY
FUTURES
MARKETS
(2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/background
er_virtualcurrency01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WBH-89ZL]; CFTC, DIGITAL ASSETS PRIMER (2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/media/5476/DigitalAssetsPrimer/download.
42. See SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO (2017) [hereinafter DAO REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/F862-YS5V].
43. SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS (2019)
[hereinafter FRAMEWORK], https://www.sec.gov/files/dlt-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4KQHW52].
44. See Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto Is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security,
All at the Same Time, 49 CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION, Apr. 2019, at 102.
45. As one group of lawyers recently observed: “The structure of the regulatory regime for
financial products and services in the United States is arguably the most complex of any
jurisdiction . . . .” Annette L. Nazareth, Mark A Sater & Zachary J. Zweihorn, Snapshot: The
Regulatory Framework for Financial Services Compliance in USA, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1d36c283-222f-42d4-a9da39b96ea19371&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email++Body++General+section&utm_campaign=Arkbar+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Dail
y+Newsfeed+2021-11-03&utm_term= [https://perma.cc/FH4T-X6Q6].
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It is also quite clear that a decision by one agency to treat particular
cryptoassets as falling under its jurisdiction does not preclude other agencies
from also claiming regulatory authority. For example, FinCEN made
headlines in May 2015 by fining Ripple Labs $700,000 for selling its XRP
token and acting as a money-services business without registering with
FinCEN.46 In making this determination, FinCEN clearly characterized XRP
as a virtual currency.47 More than five and one-half years later, on December
22, 2020, the SEC initiated legal proceedings against the same company on
the grounds that the tokens in question were securities.48 CFTC
Commissioner Dawn Stump has also carefully explained that
characterization of crypto as a commodity does not mean it cannot also be a
security.49
The SEC’s approach to determining when cryptoassets are securities has
evolved over time, and it has been anything but long established and clear.
However, the test which the SEC (usually) relies upon has indeed been
around for decades. Because the federal securities laws were not designed to
apply to cryptoassets, they do not specifically enumerate anything like crypto
as being within the ambit of the securities statutes.50 The only option for the
SEC has been to treat crypto as falling into one or more of the general
categories included in the statutory definition of “security.”51
On July 25, 2017, the SEC released its “DAO Report.”52 This marked
the first time that the SEC articulated the official position that it intended to
evaluate whether cryptoassets were investment contracts, and therefore
securities, under the Howey investment contract test developed by the United

46. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FINCEN FINES RIPPLE
LABS INC. IN FIRST CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST A VIRTUAL CURRENCY EXCHANGER
(2015), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/20150505.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQ3H3LDE].
47. Id.
48. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10832, 2021 WL 1814771 (S.D.N.Y.
May 6, 2021) [hereinafter Ripple Initial Complaint].
49. DAWN D. STUMP, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, DIGITAL ASSETS:
CLARIFYING CFTC REGULATORY AUTHORITY & THE FALLACY OF THE QUESTION, “IS IT A
COMMODITY
OR
A
SECURITY?”,
(2021),
https://www.cftc.gov/media/6306/DigitalAssetsAuthorityInfographic_CommStump082321/downl
oad [https://perma.cc/YDE2-MA9R].
50. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (providing definitions for the ‘33 Act and
tasking the SEC with promulgating rules that “promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (providing definitions for the ‘34
Act).
51. For example, both the definitions sections of the ‘33 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77b) and the ‘34 Act
(15 U.S.C. § 78c) include investment contracts and notes within the definition of securities, along
with other assets such as stock, bonds, debentures, etc.
52. DAO REPORT, supra note 42.
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States Supreme Court in 1946.53 The Howey test says that “an investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party . . . .”54
Subsequent cases have made it clear that investments need not be in
money,55 and that minor participation by the investor will not prevent the last
part of the test from being satisfied.56 Thus, relying on more recent
clarifications, the Howey test could be rephrased today as requiring the
following elements:
(i)
an investment of money (or something else of value);57
(ii)
a common enterprise;58

53. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
54. Id. at 298–99.
55. While the Howey test originally spoke only of “money,” subsequent opinions have made it
clear that “cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will create an investment
contract. Instead, the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and services,’ or ‘some other
exchange of value.’” Uselton v. Com. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir.
1991) (citations omitted) (first quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560
n.12 (1979); and then quoting Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989)), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991).
56. Although the Court in Howey said the expectation of profits needed to be based “solely” on
the efforts of others, this rule has also been modified and clarified over time. See SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (finding that
the appropriate inquiry is “whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise”); see also Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1078 (1990) (holding that the test should be whose efforts are “significant” and “essential”).
57. See supra note 55.
58. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The requirement of a “common enterprise” is the element of the
Howey test that appears to have received the most comment over the years, in part because there is
a divergence among the federal circuits. Some courts appear to require “horizontal commonality,”
some will accept “strict vertical commonality,” and some accept “broad vertical commonality.” See
Maura K. Monaghan, Note, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common Enterprise Element of
Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2152–63 (1995) (discussing the various
judicial applications of the Howey “common enterprise” element). Horizontal commonality requires
that investors’ contributions be pooled together so their fortunes rise and fall together; strict
commonality requires the investor and promoter or investment manager to have interests that are
tied together; and broad commonality generally looks to whether the investor is depending heavily
on the promoter in deciding whether to invest. Id.; see also Benjamin Akins, Jennifer L. Chapman
& Jason Gordon, The Case for the Regulation of Bitcoin Mining as a Security, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH.
669, 688–91 (2015).
On the other hand, while cases and academic commentators alike have relied on these
elements for decades, officials at the SEC have taken issue with the “common enterprise”
requirement, suggesting in recent documents that the SEC does not “view a ‘common enterprise’ as
a distinct element of the term ‘investment contract.’” FRAMEWORK, supra note 43, at 13 n.10.
Ironically, the text to which footnote 10 is appended and the note itself specifically recognize that
courts do treat the Howey test as requiring a common enterprise as a distinct element.
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the purchaser expects to receive profits;59 and
the expectation of profits is from the essential entrepreneurial
efforts of others.60
Even outside the context of cryptoassets, application of these elements
is neither simple nor straightforward.61 For example, there are multiple
approaches as to what constitutes proof of a common enterprise under this
test, with the federal circuit courts in considerable disagreement.62
(iii)
(iv)

59. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The “expectation of profits” element has also been addressed
numerous times. The United States Supreme Court held in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), that in order for this element to be met, “the primary motivation for
investing must be to achieve a return on the value invested.” Akins et al., supra note 58, at 691.
60. See supra note 56.
61. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Supreme Court and the Definition of “Security”: The
“Context” Clause, “Investment Contract” Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV.
489 (1987); Theresa A. Gabaldon, A Sense of a Security: An Empirical Study, 25 J. CORP. L. 307
(2000); Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?,
2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011).
62. Horizontal commonality appears to be the preferred test in the Second Circuit, although
strict vertical commonality may also suffice. In Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.
1994), the Second Circuit explained that “[i]f a common enterprise can be established by the mere
showing that the fortunes of investors are tied to the efforts of the promoter, two separate questions
posed by Howey . . . are effectively merged into a single inquiry . . . .” Accord Copeland v. Hill, 680
F. Supp. 466, 468 (D. Mass. 1988).
Courts in the Fourth Circuit also accept horizontal commonality, with the status of the
vertical commonality approach being unclear. In Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 986 n.8 (4th Cir.
1994), the Fourth Circuit found that horizontal commonality existed, and noted that the district court
was therefore not required to have determined whether vertical commonality was present. In SEC
v. Pinckney, 923 F. Supp. 76, 81–82 (E.D.N.C. 1996), a district court surveyed Fourth Circuit cases
on commonality and concluded that vertical commonality would be sufficient.
The Fifth Circuit appears to accept a showing of broad vertical commonality. See SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that “[t]he critical factor is
not the similitude or coincidence of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the
promoter’s efforts”); SEC v. Cont’l Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
a pooling ingredient is not necessary for establishing a common enterprise). On the other hand, a
more recent decision casts some doubt on how broadly the Fifth Circuit will be willing to define the
requirement of commonality. In Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 896 F.2d 85, 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1990), the
Fifth Circuit declined to reconsider its standard under the facts of that case, but also recognized that
its approach was “at odds with the stricter approaches taken in other circuits.”
Courts in the Eighth Circuit have not been entirely consistent in their approaches. For
example, in Sias v. Herzog, No. 04-3832, 2006 WL 2418950, at *8 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2006), one
district court acknowledged the split among the courts and analyzed the schemes in question for
horizontal commonality and strict vertical commonality, but not broad vertical commonality. Id. at
*13 n.8. On the other hand, in Top of Iowa Coop. v. Schewe, 6 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852–53 (N.D. Iowa
1998), a different district court looked at horizontal commonality and both of the vertical
commonality approaches.
The Ninth Circuit permits the “common enterprise” element to be shown either by strict
vertical commonality or horizontal commonality. SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., Inc., 952 F.2d
1125, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring proof of either strict vertical commonality or horizontal
commonality).
While the Tenth Circuit will accept horizontal commonality, it has also indicated that this
is not a rigid requirement. See McGill v. Am. Land & Expl. Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925 (10th Cir. 1985)
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In the context of new and evolving cryptoassets, the proper application
of the Howey test is even more difficult to ascertain.
At first, it appeared that the SEC was going to conclude that every
cryptoasset was a security under the Howey test. In early 2018, SEC
Chairman Jay Clayton was widely quoted as saying that he had “never” seen
an initial coin offering (“ICO”)63 that did not involve the sale of securities.64
However, a few months later, SEC Director Bill Hinman was quoted as
hinting and then saying explicitly that Bitcoin and Ethereum (undoubtedly
referring to Ether and not the Ethereum platform) are probably “no longer”
securities.65 This view was then repeated by others at the SEC, including
Chairman Clayton.66
Even more recently, the SEC released a public framework (the
“Framework”) with a convoluted, thirty-eight-factor analysis to “help”
explain when crypto will be an investment contract.67 Most of the
(rejecting the notion that horizontal commonality is required by Howey). Narrow vertical
commonality was relied upon in Walsh v. Int’l Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.
Utah 1981), although the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have formally accepted this approach.
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the broad vertical approach. See SEC v. ETS Payphones,
Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming the circuit’s adoption of the “broad vertical
commonality” approach, which “only requires a movant to show that the investors are dependent
upon the expertise or efforts of the investment promoter for their returns”), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
63. “ICO,” named in reference to initial public offerings of conventional securities, refers to
the initial sale of a new cryptoasset to the public. Originally these ICOs were assumed to be outside
the reach of regulators, and they typically allowed companies to raise funds with which to finish the
creation and launch of the promised cryptoasset. See Jake Frankenfield, Initial Coin Offering (ICO):
Coin
Launch
Defined
with
Examples,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Aug.
18,
2022),
https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-ico/.
64. On February 6, 2018, the Senate heard testimony from SEC Chairman Jay Clayton that
“every ICO token the SEC has seen so far is considered a security” and “that if a crypto-asset issued
by a company increases in value over time depending on the performance of the company, it is
considered a security.” Joseph Young, SEC Hints at Tighter Regulation for ICOs, Smart Policies
for “True Cryptocurrencies”, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/sechints-at-tighter-regulation-for-icos-smart-policies-for-true-cryptocurrencies
[https://perma.cc/Z5KF-BXG9].
65. Andrew Ancheta, SEC Says Bitcoin and Ethereum Are Not Securities, CRYPTO BRIEFING
(June 14, 2018), https://cryptobriefing.com/sec-says-bitcoin-and-ethereum-are-not-securities/
[https://perma.cc/M6VL-QPZX] (discussing comments from Director William Hinman).
66. Nikhilesh De, SEC Chair Clayton Affirms Agency’s Stance Ether Is No Longer a Security,
COINDESK (Sept. 13, 2021, 4:58 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2019/03/12/sec-chairclayton-affirms-agencys-stance-ether-is-no-longer-a-security/ [https://perma.cc/XWU7-NXS3]. In
his April 2018 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Chairman Clayton appeared
to acquiesce in the view that Bitcoin, at least, would not be a security. He explained that “there are
different types of cryptoassets. . . . A pure medium of exchange, the one that’s most often cited, is
Bitcoin. As a replacement for currency, that has been determined by most people to not be a
security.” Neeraj Agrawal, SEC Chairman Clayton: Bitcoin Is Not a Security, COIN CTR. (Apr. 27,
2018),
https://www.coincenter.org/sec-chairman-clayton-bitcoin-is-not-a-security/
[https://perma.cc/S8MF-7AKH].
67. FRAMEWORK, supra note 43.
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Framework’s numerous factors focus on the question of whether purchasers
have a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others.68
Although some of the elements are described as “especially relevant,”69 the
Framework notes that no single part of the test is “necessarily
determinative.”70 With regard to whether there is a reasonable expectation of
profits, the Framework indicates that the greater number of listed factors
present, the more likely the asset in question is to be a security.71 The
Framework does not, however, give any indication of how many of the
described characteristics are necessary or sufficient and does not explain how
to weigh any of the listed items.72
Not surprisingly, others have recognized that the Framework is so
complicated that it is not easy to understand or apply. Shortly after
publication of the Framework, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce gave a
speech raising her concerns about the new explanation.73 She observed that
the document could “raise more questions and concerns than it answers.”74
Commissioner Peirce continued:
While Howey has four factors to consider, the framework lists 38
separate considerations, many of which include several sub-points.
A seasoned securities lawyer might be able to infer which of these
considerations will likely be controlling and might therefore be
able to provide the appropriate weight to each. . . . [N]on-lawyers
and lawyers not steeped in securities law and its attendant lore will
not know what to make of the guidance. Pages worth of factors,
many of which seemingly apply to all decentralized networks,
might contribute to the feeling that navigating the securities laws
in this area is perilous business.75
As noted at the outset of this Article, the current Chair of the SEC, Gary
Gensler, began 2021 by repeatedly suggesting that congressional action was
needed in order to provide clarity and fill gaps in the regulation of
cryptoassets.76 However, when no such guidance was immediately

68. Id. at 2–11.
69. Id. at 3, § II.C.1.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 6, § II.C.2.
72. FRAMEWORK, supra note 43.
73. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Securities Enforcement Forum: How We
Howey (May 9, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-how-we-howey-050919
[https://perma.cc/729A-CG6C].
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. To illustrate this starting point, in remarks
during an August 2021 conference, Gensler specifically suggested that “[r]egulators would benefit
from additional plenary authority to write rules for and attach guardrails to crypto trading and
lending.” Gary Gensler, Chair, SEC, Remarks Before the Aspen Security Forum (Aug. 3, 2021)
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forthcoming, he shifted to suggesting that the SEC’s authority is clear under
a “broad” interpretation of the securities laws.77 The assertion that the law is
“clear” was relatively quickly followed by a plea from Gensler to attorneys
not to help their clients avoid application of the securities laws.78
Complaints about the uncertainty of crypto enforcement and confusion
about how the securities laws apply to the new asset class have been so
common that on November 8, 2021, the SEC’s Enforcement Director, Gurbir
Grewal, admitted that he often heard that the SEC is “regulating by
enforcement” when it comes to crypto.79 His response was to deny the charge,
explaining that the SEC’s actions have been based on “long-standing, wellknown and understood regulations and standards that govern the securities
industry.”80
Most people outside of the SEC appear to disagree. A range of cryptoentrepreneurs have complained about the difficulties of dealing with the
confusing and complex U.S. securities laws.81 Similarly, business leaders82

[hereinafter Gensler Remarks], https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/gensler-aspensecurity-forum-2021-08-03 [https://perma.cc/E4UU-E7RJ].
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
78. Gary Gensler, Chair, SEC, Prepared Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum (Nov.
4, 2021) [hereinafter Gensler, Enforcement], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-securitiesenforcement-forum-20211104 [https://perma.cc/79FV-69H8]. In these remarks, Gensler also noted
the frequent complaint that the SEC regulates by enforcement. His response was that “[s]ome market
participants may call this ‘regulation by enforcement.’ I just call it ‘enforcement.’” Id.
79. Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, 2021 SEC Regulation Outside the United
States—Scott
Friestad
Memorial
Keynote
Address
(Nov.
8,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-regulation-outside-united-states-110821
[https://perma.cc/92N6-DYZV] (“In my three months in this role, I have heard more than three
times the refrain that we are ‘regulating by enforcement.’”).
80. Id.
81. William Mougayar, entrepreneur and executive chairman of the Kin Foundation, pointed to
regulatory uncertainty and political fear-mongering as major obstacles to innovation and success in
the crypto ecosystem within the United States. William Mougayar, It’s Official: Political FearMongering and Regulatory Uncertainty in Cryptocurrency Are Hurting US Blockchain Companies,
MEDIUM (July 21, 2019), https://medium.com/@wmougayar/its-official-political-fear-mongeringadded-to-regulatory-uncertainty-in-cryptocurrency-are-5e831eee219e.
Marco Santori, now chief legal officer at Kraken Digital Asset Exchange and former head
of Cooley LLP’s fintech group, helped develop the SAFT Whitepaper. See infra note 87. He has
concluded that “the present regulatory environment has spawned ‘mostly a state of confusion among
entrepreneurs . . . [t]hat is not a good place for American innovation.’” Jeff Kauflin, Crypto Startups
Are Fleeing the U.S.—This Bill Is Trying to Stop Them, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2019, 12:25 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2019/01/10/crypto-startups-are-fleeing-the-usthis-bill-istrying-to-stop-them/?sh=5dc509152267. Caitlin Long, founder and CEO of Avanti Group and
crypto advocate, has complained that “[t]he SEC’s stance has caused a massive flight of startups to
offshore jurisdictions . . . Lawyers right and left were telling clients, ‘Don’t issue tokens to U.S.
investors and don’t domicile in the U.S.’” Id.
82. J.D. Seraphine, who produced the Discovery Science series Open Source Money,
complained in mid-2020 that “[t]he U.S. government has had an overall uneven approach to
regulating digital currencies and blockchain.” Charles Bovaird, Regulatory Uncertainty Greatest
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and academics83 have also expressed the opinion that it is difficult to
understand how the SEC intends to apply the U.S. securities laws to
cryptoassets. As one commentator noted, “[l]awmakers, regulators, and
financial services industry participants all are seeking more regulatory
certainty surrounding cryptos, which means new rules, guidance, or
interpretations.”84
A review of some of the most closely followed reactions to recent
developments sheds light on why crypto industry participants (and their
attorneys) are right to feel confused.
III. REGULATING BY ENFORCEMENT: THE SEC IN ACTION
This Part of the Article evaluates some of the most significant recent
decisions by the SEC with regard to enforcing the securities laws in the
context of cryptoassets. It first describes three enforcement actions initiated
by the SEC against issuers of cryptoassets, including one that involves sales
that took place over a span of more than seven years. None of these actions
were predicated on fraud or misconduct by the issuers, other than their failure
to register the sales as involving securities. It then considers the SEC’s failure
to act in the case of “stablecoins,” a particular category of cryptoassets. The
purpose of these examples is to show how the SEC is relying upon
enforcement actions to explain its rules rather than offering clear guidance
for those in the crypto industry to follow.
Problem for Blockchain Entrepreneurs, Says Producer, FORBES (July 31, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cbovaird/2020/07/31/regulatory-uncertainty-greatest-problem-forblockchain-entrepreneurs-says-producer/?sh=7b040d62481f. His take was that “this gray area of
uncertainty is the worst thing for entrepreneurs and companies attempting to operate here, and it has
led to other countries moving ahead of the U.S. in pioneering what many are calling the most
important technology since the creation of the internet.” Id.
The Digital Chamber of Commerce, a blockchain advocacy group, asked “federal
policymakers to address the ‘lack of a predictable legal environment’ it says is hindering blockchain
experimentation and innovation.” Mike Orcutt, Blockchain Boosters Warn that Regulatory
Uncertainty
Is
Harming
Innovation,
MIT TECH. REV.
(Mar.
8.
2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/08/136720/blockchain-boosters-warn-thatregulatory-uncertainty-is-harming-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/2D7R-UXZV].
83. “More than a decade after the launch of Bitcoin, regulatory ambiguity surrounding the peerto-peer virtual currency continues to discourage entrepreneurial activity by increasing risk and the
costs of compliance, according to a newly published paper by faculty at Florida Atlantic
University’s College of Business.” FAU Research Explores How Regulatory Ambiguity Has
Discouraged Entrepreneurial Activity in Bitcoin Market, AP NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://apnews.com/press-release/globe-newswire/technology-business-florida-bitcoin-floridaatlantic-university-5c86ff9eebf3a771ff2ed40a2894ccb9 [https://perma.cc/G69B-AL3J] (pointing
to a lack of guidance and unpredictable selective enforcement as two obstacles to understanding).
84. Todd Ehret, INSIGHT: U.S. Cryptocurrency Regulatory Path Appears Long and Complex,
REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2021, 1:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-cryptocurrencyregulatory-path/insight-u-s-cryptocurrency-regulatory-path-appears-long-and-complexidUSKBN2BT211 [https://perma.cc/ZJM7-2HZR].
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A. Kik Interactive Inc.
On June 6, 2019, the SEC filed a lengthy complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that a Canadian
social media company, Kik Interactive Inc. (“Kik”), had violated the federal
securities law by selling a trillion unregistered “Kin” tokens.85 In their
complaint, the SEC asserted that the sales in question satisfied the Howey
test.86
Kik had used the “SAFT” process87 to launch its Kin crypto token in
September 2017 in a token distribution event (“TDE”).88 In its complaint, the
SEC claimed that Kik’s 2017 offering of SAFTs relating to Kin tokens was
an unregistered, non-exempt sale of securities, involving a single plan of

85. Complaint ¶¶ 84–85, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(No. 19-cv-5244) [hereinafter Kik Complaint]. The complaint essentially alleged that Kik had
violated Section 5 of the ‘33 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77e) by selling unregistered securities. Id.
86. For example, in paragraph 197 of the Kik Complaint, the SEC alleges that persons who
bought the Kin tokens from Kik “made an investment of money in a common enterprise with Kik
and with each other, and reasonably would have been led to expect profits derived from the
entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of Kik and its agents.” Id. ¶ 197.
87. The SAFT, which stands for “simple agreement for future tokens,” was a project designed
to provide simple documentation that could be used to assist companies in raising funds to develop
functional cryptotokens with an anticipated functionality beyond serving as an alternative to fiat
currency. By 2015, it was already becoming increasingly clear that U.S. regulators, and particularly
the SEC, were not going to take a hands-off approach to crypto. The SAFT was therefore designed
to promote the funding and development of these new assets in a manner that was intended to
comply with the federal securities laws. Supporting documentation in the form of a whitepaper set
out a framework that the drafters clearly hoped would convince securities regulators to treat
functional utility tokens as being outside the scope of the federal securities laws. JUAN BATIZBENET, JESSE CLAYBURGH & MARCO SANTORI, THE SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT
TOKEN
SALE
FRAMEWORK
(2017)
[hereinafter
SAFT
WHITEPAPER],
https://www.cooley.com/~/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/saft-project-whitepaper.ashx
[https://perma.cc/XDP4-MQU5].
The essential idea was that an issuer seeking to develop and sell a new cryptoasset designed
to have functionality other than being a cryptocurrency (a “utility token”) could raise funds for the
development of the asset by selling contractual rights to acquire the tokens on a when-issued basis.
This stage of the offering was assumed to involve the sale of investment contracts and would
therefore be conducted pursuant to the terms of Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, an exemption from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 16 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)). The
subsequent sale of fully functional utility tokens was intended to be outside the scope of the
securities laws. Id. at 6–12 (considering in detail how the SEC might apply the Howey test to
functional utility tokens and concluding it was likely that such assets would not be securities).
88. The TDE was to be the start of the second half of the SAFT process, and since the Kin
tokens were designed to have utility and were functional at the time of this issuance, Kik proceeded
on the understanding that its tokens would not be securities. See generally Kik Announces Highly
Anticipated Token Distribution Event, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 29, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kik-announces-highly-anticipated-token-distributionevent-300511074.html [https://perma.cc/MKC4-V99H].
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distribution that needed to be viewed as part of the eventual unregistered and
non-compliant token sale.89
Kik answered the SEC’s allegations on August 6, 2019, denying that
Kik had engaged in any unlawful activity, based in part on its position that
the Kin tokens it sold were not investment contracts.90 In particular, Kik
argued that it had engaged in two separate transactions: First, the “pre-sale”
of contractual rights which was conceded to involve the sale of securities,
and second, the sale of Kin tokens, which were characterized by the company
as something other than securities.91 Kik also asserted in its answer that the
SEC’s approach to defining when cryptoassets were investment contracts
was unconstitutionally vague.92
On September 30, 2020, Judge Hellerstein ruled in favor of the SEC on
its motion for summary judgment, concluding that the “two phases” of the
Kik offering were intertwined so that the sale of contractual rights and the
eventual public offering of Kin tokens were part of a single plan of financing
with a single purpose.93 As a result, the pre-sale and TDE, which together had
raised $100 million for Kik, “constituted an unregistered offering of
securities that did not qualify for exemption.”94
As the SEC requested, the court relied on the Howey investment contract
test in determining that the offering involved the distribution of securities.95
The judge treated the entire plan as a single offering meeting the elements of
89. Kik Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 189 (noting, for example, that “the fortunes of each Kin
investor were tied to one another and to the success of the overall venture, including the
development of a Kin Ecosystem, integration with Kik Messenger, creation of the Rewards Engine,
and implementation of a new transaction service and/or bespoke blockchain. Investors’ profits were
also tied to Kik’s profits based on Kik’s significant holdings of Kin”).
90. Kik’s answer was “fairly combative.” Stephen A. Rutenberg, Thomas H. Wagner & Jason
A. Nagi, BitBlog Weekly Summary: Kik Kicks Back and the SEC Continues Its Enforcement
Campaign
Against
ICOs,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Aug.
19,
2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/bitblog-weekly-summary-kik-kicks-back-and-seccontinues-its-enforcement-campaign#google_vignette
[https://perma.cc/3ZAY-QSRL].
See
Answer to Complaint, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 19cv-5244) [hereinafter Kik Answer], https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/15722539/22/ussecurities-and-exchange-commission-v-kik-interactive-inc/ [https://perma.cc/8GG9-REXJ].
91. “The Commission is wrong that Kik sold Kin in a single ‘offer and sale.’ In reality, the
distribution of Kin involved two entirely separate transactions: (1) a pre-sale of contractual rights,
pursuant to SAFTs . . . and (2) the sale of Kin to the public (the ‘TDE’) . . . .” Kik Answer, supra
note 90, at 4 (response to paragraph 1 of Kik Complaint).
92. Kik Answer, supra note 90. One of the problems raised by Kik was that the SEC had not
even explained its approach to crypto regulation until after the Kik offering was underway. Kik had
announced its plans to create and distribute Kin tokens on May 25, 2017, and the company began
its pre-sale in June of that year. It was not until July 25, 2017, that the SEC released its DAO Report.
See supra note 42. The SEC did not initiate legal action against Kik for another two years, filing its
complaint on June 4, 2019. See Kik Complaint, supra note 85.
93. SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169, 174, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
94. Id. at 182.
95. Id. at 177.
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Howey. He seemed particularly influenced by Kik’s promotional efforts
extolling the profit-potential of Kin, the lack of consumptive uses available
for the token on the date of its original launch, and references to the range of
activities that Kik anticipated would support the growth of the Kin ecosystem
and token value.96 He was not convinced by the prominent representations
from purchasers during the first stage that they were not buying with an intent
to redistribute the tokens.97
In determining that the pre-sale was part of an integrated offering along
with the eventual tokens (thus destroying the claimed exemption for the sale
of the contractual rights as well as tainting subsequent sales), the judge
looked to conventional integration doctrine analysis.98 He found that “most
notably, the Pre-Sale and TDE sale were part of a single plan of financing
and made for the same general purpose. Proceeds from both sales went
toward funding Kik’s operations and building the ecosystem for Kin.”99 The
offerings also occurred at about the same time.100 Oddly, despite noting that
the rights of purchasers in the two stages of the offering differed, he also
concluded that the pre-sale of contractual rights involved the same class of
securities as the eventual sales of the functional token.101 The only fact that,
in the judge’s mind, weighed against integration was that there were different
forms of consideration paid in the two phases of the offering.102
The ultimate impact of this decision is unclear.103 First, the final order
was entered as a result of a settlement agreement so there was no appeal,

96. Judge Hellerstein opined that “none of [the contemplated] ‘consumptive use’ was available
at the time of the distribution.” Id. at 180.
97. Kik’s SAFT documentation included a specific representation that the SAFTs were being
purchased for investment and not with a view towards distribution. Id. at 174–75. The private
placement memorandum also warned of the purchasers’ obligations in this regard. Id.
98. No doubt because Kik relied upon Regulation D for its claimed exemption for the sale of
SAFTs, Judge Hellerstein cited the integration rule included in that exemption. Id. at 181 (citing 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(a)).
99. Id.
100. The Kin offering began one day after the SAFT sale was complete. Id. at 174.
101. The order states, somewhat misleadingly, that “[p]urchasers in the two sales received the
same class of securities, fungible Kin that were equal in value.” Id. at 182. Although Judge
Hellerstein concluded that the end result of the process was the “distribution of identical assets,” he
did acknowledge that the two groups (the original accredited investors who purchased contractual
rights and the eventual owners) “received them via different instruments with different rights.” Id.
102. “The only factor weighing against a finding of integration is that Kik received different
forms of consideration from the two sales. For the Pre-Sale, Kik received consideration in the form
of U.S. dollars. For the TDE, Kik received consideration in the form of Ether.” Id.
103. Kik’s General Counsel, Eileen Lyon, reacted to the eventual decision of the court with
considerable disappointment and some confusion. She is quoted as having said:
The ruling may raise more questions than it answers, since it applies only to our original
token distribution. The SEC should engage in proper rulemaking, including the
opportunity for public commentary, rather than force our industry to hunt for regulatory
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meaning that this is a ruling from a single federal court judge.104 Second, the
Kin offering does not necessarily mirror other SAFT-type offerings, which
may involve more time between the phases of the offering or may include a
more extensive set of applications for the token when issued.105 But the most
significant problem in trying to rely on Kik to predict future outcomes stems
from the SEC’s decision in November 2020 to substantially revise the
integration doctrine106 that Judge Hellerstein used.107
As worded now, if multiple offerings are integrated (i.e., treated as being
part of the same distribution for purposes of registration or qualifying for an
exemption), the issuer must have a reasonable belief that each offering
complies with the registration requirements or applicable exemption from
registration.108 For offers prohibiting general solicitation, the issuer is
required to reasonably believe, “based on the facts and circumstances,” that
the issuer either did not solicit the purchaser through any general solicitation
or that, prior to the offering, the issuer had established a “substantive
relationship” with the purchaser.109 However, the rule now also includes four
non-exclusive “safe harbors” against integration.110
clues among the SEC’s conflicting statements, Commissioner and staff speeches, noaction letters, closed-door meetings with the SEC, and nonprecedential settlements.
Kik Responds to Court Ruling in Favor of SEC, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 30, 2020, 6:45 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/kik-responds-to-court-ruling-in-favor-of-sec301142420.html [https://perma.cc/GK3R-VTUY]. Since this is a trial court decision rendered by a
single judge, it is not a binding precedent for cases brought in other courts, and it will be up to other
judges to determine whether to regard the opinion as persuasive.
104. The final order in the lawsuit was entered into by agreement between the parties. The Good
News
on
Kik’s
Settlement
with
the
SEC,
MEDIUM
(Dec.
1,
2020),
https://blockchainassoc.medium.com/the-good-news-on-kiks-settlement-with-the-seccc8a8eed7a35.
105. In commenting on the final order in SEC v. Kik, the Blockchain Association specifically
commented on the fact that “Kik’s token offering was unique,” therefore limiting its importance in
determining how future deals will be assessed. Id.
106. SEC Harmonizes and Improves “Patchwork” Exempt Offering Framework, SEC (Nov. 2,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-273 [https://perma.cc/6PRF-KA5S]. For the
final rule itself, see Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by
Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets, 86 Fed. Reg. 3496 (Jan. 14, 2021) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 227, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274).
107. In fact, Heading III in the order is entitled “The Pre-Sale Was Part of an Integrated
Offering.” SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F. Supp. 3d 169, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152(a).
109. Id. § 230.152(a)(1), (a)(1)(ii). In the event that the two offerings take place concurrently,
additional requirements are also imposed. Id. § 230.152(a)(2).
110. The new integration provision states: “No integration analysis under paragraph (a) of this
section is required, if any of the following non-exclusive safe harbors apply . . . .” Id. § 230.152(b).
Prior to the amendments, Rule 152 read: “The phrase transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering in section 4(a)(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public
offering at the time of said transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a
public offering and/or files a registration statement.” Id. § 230.152 (2013) (repealed 2021) (citations
omitted).
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The first listed safe harbor against application of these general principles
would seem to be the most significant for crypto entrepreneurs. It gives a safe
harbor against integration for “[a]ny offering made more than 30 calendar
days before the commencement of any other offering, or more than 30
calendar days after the termination or completion of any other offering.”111
If, however, the initial sales involve general solicitation or advertising and
the latter sales are made pursuant to an exemption that does not allow such
communication,112 the issuer must have a reasonable belief that the original
purchasers were not solicited with general advertisements, or if there was a
general solicitation, it was done to establish a substantive relationship
between the purchaser and the issuer.113
There are three other listed safe harbors, but they are all narrower than
the one that was just described. One applies to distributions of securities in
compliance with a bona fide compensation plan under Rule 701;114 the next
applies if the second offering is registered with the SEC;115 and the last
applies if the second offering is made pursuant to an exemption that allows
general solicitation.116 The last option could prove useful in some situations,
but the typical approach of most crypto deals, and certainly those conducted
via the SAFT process, is to structure the final sales as being outside the scope
of securities laws, rather than being made pursuant to a specific exemption
that allows or disallows general solicitation.
Having described the new rules, the question remains as to how they
should be applied to two-phase crypto distributions, such as those
contemplated by the SAFT whitepaper117 and the process employed by Kik
in its distribution of contractual rights and tokens.118 Should the initial sale of
contractual rights to acquire tokens when issued be treated as part of a single
scheme to distribute the planned cryptoassets, or are the two phases really
distinct transactions that should be eligible for the safe harbors in these new
rules? Unfortunately, the answer to this is not clear.
For example, the introductory language to new Rule 152 creates
ambiguity by stating that “the provisions of this section will not have the
effect of avoiding integration for any transaction or series of transactions that,
although in technical compliance with the section, is part of a plan or scheme

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. § 230.152(b)(1).
Id.
Id. (cross-referencing the requirements of id. § 230.152(a)(1)).
Id. § 230.152(b)(2).
Id. § 230.152(b)(3).
Id. § 230.152(b)(4).
See supra note 87 for a description of the SAFT process.
See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text for a review of the Kik offering.
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to evade the registration requirements of the Act.”119 Because the entire
purpose of an exemption is to avoid the registration requirements, it is
difficult to understand exactly what this language will cover.
In the discussion of the comments received on the proposed rule, the
SEC noted some concern about the possibility that “an issuer could identify
investors through a general solicitation and then sell to such investors in a
subsequent private offering.”120 In explaining its decision to adopt the antievasion introductory language, the SEC said the function of the language is
“to describe what is provided in the rule and caution issuers that Rule 152
may not be used as part of a plan or scheme to evade the registration
requirements of the Securities Act.”121
Consider this “explanation” in the context of a typical crypto offering
structured with an initial phase where contractual rights such as SAFTs are
sold and a later token distribution occurs once the cryptoasset has been
developed. In the first phase, the issuer sells contractual rights to acquire the
token at a future date. These sales are generally conducted so as to comply
with Rule 506(c) of Regulation D,122 although other exemptions from
registration could work. The general consensus has always been that these
sales would involve the distribution of an investment contract that qualifies
as a security.123 At some point, ideally at least thirty days after the sale of
SAFTs has ended, the programming for the token would be completed and it
would be launched.124
In SEC v. Kik, the token sales were collapsed by the court into the initial
sale of contractual rights under the traditional integration doctrine.125 If there
had been a built-in thirty-day delay between the end of the SAFT sales and
the token issuance (and assuming there was a thirty-day period in which
resales were not allowed), would the new safe harbors against integration
have come into play? We simply do not know.
The very fact that SEC officials are urging attorneys not to help cryptobased clients avoid application of the securities laws,126 and to “voluntarily”
119. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152.
120. Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving
Access to Capital in Private Markets, 86 Fed. Reg. 3496, 3503 (Jan. 14, 2021).
121. Id. at 3503–04.
122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123. See SAFT WHITEPAPER, supra note 87.
124. The thirty-day safe harbor did not exist at the time of the Kin TDE. Therefore, Kik had set
up the TDE to start a single day after conclusion of the SAFT offering. SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 3d 169, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
125. Id. at 181–82.
126. See Gensler, Enforcement, supra note 78 (in which Gensler pointedly asked attorneys not
to aid clients “paper over the cracks” in regard to the securities laws). The warning did not go
unremarked. See John Reed Stark, SEC Warning to Crypto Attys Harkens to Prior Crackdowns,
LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2021, 5:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1441969/sec-warning-to-
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comply with disclosure requirements,127 suggests that there is considerable
uncertainty in this area.128
B. Telegram
Similar facts were present in another recent highly publicized action by
the SEC against a planned token distribution, this time by Telegram Group
Inc. and Ton Issuer, Inc. (jointly, “Telegram”).129 Telegram, which according
crypto-attys-harkens-to-prior-crackdowns (noting that Gensler “seized the opportunity to admonish
the rising crop of self-anointed fintech lawyers . . . to stop trying to help their clients cover up
securities regulation failures and compliance deficiencies”); see also Chris Matthews, SEC’s
Gensler Warns Securities Lawyers: Don’t ‘Help Paper Over the Cracks’ of Client Misconduct,
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 4, 2021, 1:40 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/secs-genslerwarns-securities-lawyers-dont-help-paper-over-the-cracks-of-client-misconduct-11636047621
[https://perma.cc/ECQ6-QLJF] (quoting Gensler telling lawyers to “be the first lines of defense,”
particularly “when a client is getting close to crossing the line”).
Nor is Gensler the only SEC official warning attorneys of their need to assist in increasing
compliance. Gurbir Grewal, Director of Enforcement for the SEC, warned in 2021 that when
gatekeepers such as attorneys “are living up to their obligations, they serve as the first lines of
defense against misconduct. But when they don’t, investors, market integrity, and public trust all
suffer. Encouraging your clients to play in the grey areas or walk right up to the line creates
significant risk.” Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct.
13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-sec-speaks-101321. In 2018, then-Chairman
Jay Clayton issued similar warnings:
Market professionals, especially gatekeepers, need to act responsibly and hold
themselves to high standards. To be blunt, from what I have seen recently, particularly in
the initial coin offering (“ICO”) space, they can do better. Our securities laws—and 80
plus years of practice—assume that securities lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and
dealers will act responsibly. It is expected that they will bring expertise, judgment, and a
healthy dose of skepticism to their work. Said another way, even when the issue presented
is narrow, market professionals are relied upon to bring knowledge of the broad legal
framework, accounting rules, and the markets to bear.
Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute (Jan. 22,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-012218.
127. On November 9, 2021, in an article posted to the SEC webpage, Commissioner Caroline
Crenshaw urged DeFi (decentralized finance) participants to “voluntarily comply” with disclosure
requirements under the federal securities laws. Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on DeFi Risks,
Regulations, and Opportunities (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/crenshawdefi-20211109 [https://perma.cc/FFY8-WL8K] (originally published in Caroline Crenshaw, DeFi
Risks, Regulations, and Opportunities, 1 INT’L J. OF BLOCKCHAIN L., Nov. 2021, at 4, 8).
128. As one commentator noted, “[t]he S.E.C. has yet to set clear rules on cryptocurrencies,
leaving the industry guessing. Maybe that’s just how the agency wants it.” Sheelah Kolhatkar, The
Challenges
of
Regulating
Cryptocurrency,
NEW YORKER
(Oct.
6,
2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-challenges-of-regulating-cryptocurrency
[https://perma.cc/S86C-5GX5].
129. For popular commentary using this short-hand reference, see David I. Miller & Charlie
Berk, SEC v. Telegram: A Groundbreaking Decision in Cryptocurrency Enforcement?, 10 NAT’L
L. REV. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-v-telegram-groundbreakingdecision-cryptocurrency-enforcement; Anna Baydakova, Making Sense of the SEC’s Case Against
Telegram,
COINDESK
(Sept.
14,
2021,
4:28
AM),
https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2020/04/12/making-sense-of-the-secs-case-against-telegram/
[https://perma.cc/3Z3K-X5WM]; SEC v. Telegram: Key Takeaways and Implications, COOLEY
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to its webpage is currently headquartered in Dubai,130 began raising capital
in January 2018 in a SAFT offering.131 In the initial phase of fundraising,
which lasted from January to March of 2018, Telegram raised approximately
$1.7 billion by selling contractual rights to acquire 2.9 billion digital tokens
(called “Grams”) to 171 initial purchasers worldwide in a SAFT132 offering
limited to accredited investors.133 As Kik had done, Telegram designed the
first phase to comply with the requirements of Rule 506(c) of Regulation
D.134
The Grams were to be delivered upon the launch of the TON
Blockchain, which was scheduled to occur no later than October 31, 2019.135
Following the token launch, the plan was that both the initial investors and
Telegram would be able to sell Grams to additional purchasers. Because the
plan was to have a fully functional blockchain and tokens before this
occurred, Telegram expected that at that time, the Grams would not be
securities and instead would be treated as a currency or commodity.136
Shortly before the Grams were to be delivered in the fall of 2019, the
SEC filed an emergency action alleging that Telegram had violated the
federal securities laws by conducting an unregistered digital token
(May 7, 2020) [hereinafter COOLEY ALERT], https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2020/2020-0507-sec-v-telegram-key-takeaways-implications [https://perma.cc/EXN5-Z9NG].
130. Telegram
FAQ,
TELEGRAM,
https://telegram.org/faq#q-how-old-is-telegram
[https://perma.cc/FT8N-9P7C] (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).
131. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 19
Civ.
9439)
[hereinafter
Telegram
Complaint],
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp-pr2019-212.pdf. Technically speaking,
Telegram did not utilize the SAFT documentation. Particularly in the face of the SEC’s resistance
to the SAFT process, many other labels have been applied to these kinds of arrangements; in the
case of Telegram, the label used was “Gram Purchase Agreement.” “[C]omparable agreements by
other issuers come under a myriad of titles, [but] the Gram Purchase Agreements and their relatives
are commonly known as Simple Agreements for Future Tokens (SAFTs), even though many
practitioners, cognizant of the SEC’s long-held suspicions, avoid using the term.” Courtney Rogers
Perrin & J. Gray Sasser, SAFTs May Survive Telegram’s Garbled Message, FROST BROWN TODD
LLC (Nov. 19, 2019), https://frostbrowntodd.com/safts-may-survive-telegrams-garbledmessage/#page=1. This Article refers to the Telegram process as involving SAFTs.
132. The SAFT process is described supra at note 87.
133. Telegram Complaint, supra note 131, at 2. “Accredited investors” are defined in Rule
501(a) of Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). Most investors gain accredited status by virtue of
wealth, but sophistication and knowledge are also now allowed as the basis for accredited status.
SEC Modernizes the Accredited Investor Definition, SEC (Aug. 26, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-191 [https://perma.cc/Y34H-7QJ3].
134. In the Telegram litigation, both parties stipulated that Telegram had relied on 506(c) of
Regulation D to exempt the sale of contractual rights. See SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F. Supp.
3d 352, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (referring to Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 48, 52, 55,
Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (No. 19 Civ. 9439) [https://perma.cc/4WFC-XSQR]).
135. Telegram Complaint, supra note 131, at 2.
136. See Defendants’ Answer, Defenses and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 2,
Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (No. 19 Civ. 9439) [hereinafter Telegram Answer]
[https://perma.cc/9D9W-ZTM2].
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offering.137 As part of its complaint, the SEC requested (and received) an ex
parte temporary restraining order “to prevent Telegram from flooding the
U.S. markets with digital tokens that . . . were [allegedly] unlawfully sold.”138
Telegram responded promptly,139 with a brief claiming that there was no need
for an emergency order140 and requesting the court deny the SEC’s request
for a preliminary injunction.141 Part of Telegram’s reasoning was that the
SEC had failed to provide notice of how it intended to interpret or apply the
securities laws, despite Telegram engaging in eighteen months of dialogue
with the SEC about its plans.142
On November 12, 2019, Telegram filed its answer to the SEC’s
complaint denying the SEC’s allegations and claiming that the SEC was
engaging in “regulation by enforcement.”143 Two amici curiae briefs were
submitted in support of Telegram, both taking the position that the Grams
should not be presumed to be securities.144 In opposition to those arguments,
three experts for the SEC opined that the TON network was not sufficiently
mature and decentralized to function without additional input from Telegram
137. Telegram Complaint, supra note 131, at 3, 29.
138. SEC Halts Alleged $1.7 Billion Unregistered Digital Token Offering, SEC (Oct. 11, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212 [https://perma.cc/759K-97DH].
139. The initial response to the SEC’s emergency request for a preliminary injunction in the
Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Emergency Application for Preliminary
Injunction, Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (No. 19 Civ. 9439) [hereinafter Telegram Response],
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.524448/gov.uscourts.nysd.524448.7.0.p
df [https://perma.cc/LH9H-QAKZ], was filed October 16, 2019.
140. This initial response specifically alleged that Telegram had spent the preceding eighteen
months in voluntary talks with, and soliciting feedback from, the SEC, “consistent with the SEC’s
publicly stated desire to engage with developers of digital asset technologies.” Id. at 1 (citing
Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (FinHub), SEC (June 14, 2022), a copy of
which has been archived at https://perma.cc/4WFH-6HKA). FinHub currently “encourages anyone
working with RegTech solutions or implementations to engage with FinHub as part of this
initiative.”
FinHub
to
Host
Virtual
Meet-Ups,
SEC
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-130 [https://perma.cc/F52V-Z52X].
141. Telegram Response, supra note 139, at 4.
142. For example, the Telegram response claimed that despite being fully aware of the terms of
the proposed offering, “the SEC (i) never requested that Telegram delay the launch of the TON
Blockchain; [and] (ii) never advised Telegram of its intention to seek injunctive relief . . . .”
Telegram Response, supra note 139, at 2.
143. Telegram Answer, supra note 136, at 1.
144. Anna Baydakova, Blockchain Association Sides with Telegram Against SEC, Says Grams
Are Not Securities, YAHOO (Jan. 22, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/blockchainassociation-sides-telegram-against-121713959.html. The Blockchain Association’s amicus brief is
described at Blockchain Association, Blockchain Association Stands Up for Crypto Industry in
Amicus
Brief
for
Telegram
Case,
MEDIUM
(Jan.
21,
2020),
https://medium.com/@BlockchainAssoc/blockchain-association-stands-up-for-crypto-industry-inamicus-brief-for-telegram-case-2a0d92a3803b [https://perma.cc/2MSG-L6SD]. A copy of the
amicus brief filed by the Chamber of Digital Commerce is archived at https://perma.cc/27CR-P6VS.
Both the Digital Chamber of Commerce and the Blockchain Association are not-for-profit
organizations seeking to promote blockchain-based technologies.

2022]

REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT

133

and that a reasonable investor would have purchased the tokens with an
expectation of profit.145 The CFTC also filed a brief, stating its position that
the Grams were commodities but concluding that should not preclude them
from also being regulated as securities.146
On February 19, 2020, the SEC and Telegram presented arguments on
the “economic realities” of the planned Grams. The SEC argued that the
entire plan of distribution should be treated as a single transaction, while
Telegram argued that the SAFT sales and eventual launch of the Gram tokens
should be viewed as two distinct events, with only the first involving the sale
of investment contracts. It took the judge more than a month to conclude that
the SEC had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and on
March 24, 2020—before the Kik litigation was decided—the court granted
the preliminary injunction, halting the planned issuance of Grams with the
following explanation:
The Court finds that the SEC has shown a substantial likelihood of
success in proving that the contracts and understandings at issue,
including the sale of 2.9 billion Grams to 175 purchasers in
exchange for $1.7 billion, are part of a larger scheme to distribute
those Grams into a secondary public market, which would be
supported by Telegram’s ongoing efforts. Considering the
economic realities under the Howey test, the Court finds that, in the
context of that scheme, the resale of Grams into the secondary
public market would be an integral part of the sale of securities
without a required registration statement.147
Telegram promptly appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit,148 but dropped the appeal in early May 2020, agreeing to
return $1.2 billion to investors worldwide and to pay a fine of $18.5 million
to the SEC.149
Although initiated after the enforcement action against Kik, Telegram
was the first of the cases discussed here to be decided. Its precedential value

145. Stefan Stankovic, SEC Taps 3 Experts on Why Telegram’s Token Is a Security,
CRYPTOBRIEFING (Jan. 30, 2020), https://cryptobriefing.com/sec-taps-experts-gram-tokensecurity/ [https://perma.cc/B3GR-PY5N].
146. Shiraz Jagati, CFTC Joins the Telegram vs. SEC Case, Shedding Light on Likely Verdict,
COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 21, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/cftc-joins-the-telegram-vs-seccase-shedding-light-on-likely-verdict [https://perma.cc/K2YB-RGH4].
147. SEC v. Telegram Grp., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 358 (S.D.N.Y 2020).
148. Richard B. Levin & Stephen A. Rutenberg, Hanging on the Telephone: Judge Enters Order
Blocking
Telegram
ICO,
10
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Apr.
14,
2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/hanging-telephone-judge-enters-order-blocking-telegramico [https://perma.cc/LS54-B94M].
149. Telegram to Return $1.2 Billion to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million Penalty to Settle SEC
Charges, SEC (June 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-146.

134

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:107

is perhaps even less clear than that of the Kik opinion.150 First, it is not only
the opinion of a single trial judge, but it is also a decision involving a
preliminary injunction, not rendered after a trial or hearing on the merits.151
Second, as happened in Kik, the appeal was dropped without giving the
Second Circuit a chance to agree or disagree with the trial court’s reasoning.
And, as was the case with Kik, the new integration rules were not yet in effect
when the offering occurred152 or when the decision was announced.153 Thus,
there is no way to predict whether a built-in thirty-day gap between the end
of trading in the contractual rights and the issuance of the ultimate tokens
will matter in future transactions.
The facts of the case are also quite significant, especially given the
SEC’s repeated reminders that application of Howey depends on the specific
facts and circumstances of each offering.154 It is quite possible that a
relatively minor change in the facts could have led to a different outcome. As
reported elsewhere:
[S]hortly after the SEC brought its action to enjoin the Telegram
launch in October 2019, a SEC staff member noted expressly that
the SAFT model should and could still work so long as resale was
tied not just to a set period of time but rather linked to a point in

150. The Kik order’s potential impact is considered supra at notes 103–107 and accompanying
text.
151. As one case analysis notes, “[t]he Telegram opinion comes out of the influential Southern
District of New York, but it is the opinion of a single trial court, rendered on a preliminary injunction
standard.” COOLEY ALERT, supra note 129.
152. As noted supra at notes 130–137 and accompanying text, the offering of contractual rights
in the Telegram case occurred in 2018, and the Grams themselves were set to launch in 2019.
153. The court’s order was published on March 24, 2020, several months before the November
adoption of the new integration rules. See supra notes 106–116 and accompanying text for a
description of the adoption of the current integration rules.
154. The DAO Report emphasized the importance of considering the specific facts of the
situation in ascertaining when cryptoassets should be treated as securities:
This definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profits.” [SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 299 (1946)] . . . The test “permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of
compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’”
Id. In analyzing whether something is a security, “form should be disregarded for
substance,” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), “and the emphasis should
be on economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto.”
[United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)].
DAO REPORT, supra note 42, at 11 (emphasis omitted). This was confirmed in the SEC’s
Framework on digital assets, which noted that “[w]hether a particular digital asset at the time of its
offer or sale satisfies the Howey test depends on the specific facts and circumstances.”
FRAMEWORK, supra note 43, at 2.
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time in which the resale of the underlying token would no longer
be a securities transaction.155
The staff member, of course, gave no clear indication of what point in time
would convert an underlying token to something other than a security.
C. Ripple
An even more recent enforcement action by the SEC further illustrates
how its actions can catch companies unaware of how broadly the securities
laws can apply. As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, in May 2015,
FinCEN made a determination that Ripple Labs was subject to its jurisdiction
because Ripple’s XRP token was a currency substitute.156 Despite numerous
opportunities in the coming years to announce that the SEC believed Ripple
was issuing securities when it sold XRP, the SEC was apparently silent on
the topic until late 2020. On December 22, 2020, the SEC initiated an
enforcement action based on allegations that Ripple had been selling XRP
tokens, which the SEC declared to be securities, without registration or an
exemption for the past several years.157
This case is somewhat different from the Kik and Telegram
distributions. First, Ripple did not issue the XRP tokens pursuant to anything
like the SAFT. The XRP ledger was completed in December of 2012, and at
that time the computer code set a fixed supply of 100 billion tokens.158 When
launched, 80 billion XRP were transferred to Ripple and the remaining
twenty billion tokens went to a group of founders.159
According to the SEC’s complaint, what followed was a very long
unregistered offering of XRP tokens.160 As described by the SEC, Ripple
eventually issued approximately 14.6 billion XRP in a combination of

155. COOLEY ALERT, supra note 129.
156. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
157. Ripple Initial Complaint, supra note 48. On February 18, 2021, the complaint was amended,
and most references in the text will be to this version. First Amended Complaint, SEC v. Ripple
Labs, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10832, 2021 WL 1814771 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2021) [hereinafter Ripple
Amended Complaint] [https://perma.cc/XEG3-ANQV].
158. Ripple Amended Complaint, supra note 157, ¶ 45.
159. Id. ¶ 46. There is actually some debate about the original transactions. The first 32,569
ledger entries were accidentally lost due to a bug in the program. Anton Lucian & Kyle Baird, XRP’s
Genesis Block Still Has No Record, BEINCRYPTO (Dec. 15, 2019, 5:20 PM),
https://beincrypto.com/xrps-genesis-block-still-has-no-record/
[https://perma.cc/CPE9-F9WF].
While the SEC claims that the initial issuance of XRP was to the company, other versions of the
genesis transactions suggest that the initial distribution was to the founders, who in turn contributed
or gifted (depending on the source) eighty billion XRP to the company. See Provide a Better
Alternative to Bitcoin, XRP, https://xrpl.org/history.html [https://perma.cc/9Y9Q-856G] (last
visited Aug. 8, 2022).
160. The amended complaint states that “Ripple engaged in this illegal securities offering from
2013 to the present . . . .” Ripple Amended Complaint, supra note 157, ¶ 3.
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distributions via bounty programs, as compensation to programmers and
developers, and to institutional and other market participants.161 These sales
raised approximately $1.38 billion to fund Ripple’s operations.162
Most of these sales occurred before the SEC had issued its DAO Report
in 2017, and according to Ripple’s answer to the SEC complaint,163 they also
took place up to five years after XRP was determined to be a virtual currency
by FinCEN and after more than two and a half years of investigation, during
which time the SEC permitted Ripple to distribute its token and expand its
network, allowing millions of purchasers to rely on the free and efficient
functioning of the market.164 Ripple’s answer begins with the company’s
position that its XRP token is not an investment contract,165 and then alleges
that the SEC’s complaint “is a sprawling and convoluted effort to allege that
Ripple’s distributions of XRP (through numerous and varied methods) over
a nearly eight-year period constitute a single, unbroken distribution” that
should have been registered.166
The most common reactions to the lawsuit appear to have been surprise
and frustration.167 On January 1, 2021, a group of XRP holders, led by
attorney John Deaton, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island asking the court to force
the SEC to exclude their XRP tokens from its pending litigation against

161. Id. ¶ 1.
162. Id.
163. Answer of Defendant Ripple Labs, Inc. to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Ripple
Labs, Inc., 2021 WL 1814771 [hereinafter Ripple Answer] [https://perma.cc/8R25-X4PR].
164. Id. ¶ 4.
165. Id. ¶ 1.
166. Id. ¶ 12.
167. See Jeff John Roberts, SEC Is ‘Dead Wrong’: Former Chair Mary Jo White Defends Ripple
in
Pivotal
Crypto
Case,
FORTUNE
(Feb.
19,
2021,
10:00
AM),
https://fortune.com/2021/02/19/ripple-sec-lawsuit-mary-jo-white-crypto-unlicensed-securities-xrp/
[https://perma.cc/QAB3-Y9KT] (commenting that “the broader crypto-industry reacted with
surprise and alarm”). Similarly, Roslyn Layton, a senior contributor to Forbes, characterized the
action as a “bombshell lawsuit” that has become a “cause célèbre in the cryptocurrency
community . . . [with] sweeping implications about regulatory overreach . . . .” Roslyn Layton, SEC
Assault on Ripple Provokes Wider Debate, FORBES (June 30, 2021, 4:56 PM) [hereinafter Layton,
Debate], https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/06/30/sec-assault-on-ripple-provokeswider-debate/?sh=51e39c5c29e1. Another commentator suggested that case was a “time bomb”
going off, with the case being:
[E]mblematic of the murky regulation enveloping digital currency, reflecting the
mismatch between laws largely developed during the Great Depression and today’s
burgeoning fintech ecosystem. While opinions differ on whether the SEC has a strong
case against Ripple, almost everyone agrees that the underlying problem is a lack of
clarity over how cryptocurrency can be regulated . . . .
David H. Freedman, Why Ripple’s SEC Lawsuit Could Have a Lasting Impact on Crypto, FORTUNE
(July 29, 2021, 5:20 AM), https://fortune.com/2021/07/29/ripple-xrp-sec-lawsuit-impact-oncrypto-industry/ [https://perma.cc/6TLB-5CA8].
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Ripple on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not purchased investment
contracts.168 Deaton’s petition argues that the SEC, under the leadership of
then-chairman Jay Clayton, “caused multi-billion-dollar losses to innocent
investors who have purchased, exchanged, received and/or acquired the
Digital Asset XRP.”169 In the memorandum submitted in support of the
petition for a writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs make it clear that they did not
invest in XRP in order to make a profit based on efforts of Ripple.170
While there is no statute of limitations on the SEC’s ability to bring
enforcement actions for conducting an unregistered offering, the public
backlash against this particular lawsuit has been notable.171 Commentators
not only point to decisions from regulators in other jurisdictions that XRP is
a currency rather than a security,172 but the unpredictability and unfairness of
the SEC waiting so long to act if, indeed, the rules are as “clear” as the SEC
claims.173
D. Stablecoins: Regulation by Inaction
The response of the SEC described in this Section of the Article is
different from that described in the preceding three sections in that there has
been no specific enforcement action initiated by the SEC. Rather, it is the
lack of intervention despite significant evidence of fraud and misconduct that
is particularly problematic if, as the SEC claims, its authority in the space is
extensive and clear.174
168. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 26, Deaton v. Roisman (In re Deaton), No. 21-cv-00001
(D.R.I. Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.tbstat.com/wp/uploads/2021/01/xrp_investors_sec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QMM-NEF4].
169. Id. ¶ 2.
170. Memorandum in Support of Writ of Mandamus ¶ 163, In re Deaton, No. 21-cv-00001
[https://perma.cc/9QMM-NEF4] (“The Petitioners and all others similarly situated are unaware of
efforts or statements by Ripple leading the Petitioners to expect profits for their purchase or
acquisition of XRP. To the contrary, some named Petitioners are aware that Ripple executives and
former executives have publicly stated that XRP was not designed for retail investors.”).
171. “No one expected the tsunami of legal, political and social media action from retail
cryptocurrency investors, outraged by the betrayal from an agency claiming to protect their
interests.” Roslyn Layton, The Crypto Uprising the SEC Didn’t See Coming, FORBES (Aug. 30,
2021, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/08/30/the-crypto-uprising-thesec-didnt-see-coming/?sh=275e26a7143e [https://perma.cc/NF5L-4ZM5].
172. Layton, Debate, supra note 167 (“Financial regulatory authorities in Japan, Singapore, the
U.K., Switzerland, and the UAE have already declared that XRP is a currency, not a security.”).
173. Former SEC Chair Mary Jo White, who admittedly lacks impartiality as she is serving as
counsel to Ripple, reacted to the lawsuit by commenting on the fact that the SEC waited until
December 2020 to bring the lawsuit: “As a former U.S. attorney and SEC chair, you know that when
it takes that long to figure out a case you probably shouldn’t be bringing it.” Roberts, supra note
167.
174. As one commentator complained, the SEC “is playing a ridiculous game with the
blockchain and cryptocurrency industry and the millions of investors it claims it’s trying to protect.
The agency insists there is ‘clarity’ on the rules it applies to digital assets, but will only communicate
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Stablecoins are a form of crypto designed to have stable pricing as
compared to the extreme volatility associated with most cryptoassets.175 The
value of a stablecoin is generally pegged to an external asset class such as a
single fiat currency (with the U.S. dollar being the most popular), a basket of
fiat currencies, or a tangible commodity (such as gold). A stablecoin may be
collateralized off-chain, meaning that the issuer or a related entity holds
sufficient amounts of the relevant fiat or commodity to ensure price stability.
Alternatively, the stablecoin may be collateralized on-chain, by holding other
cryptoassets. The preferred form of on-chain collateral has been Ethereum. It
is also possible for a stablecoin to be uncollateralized, depending instead on
algorithms and smart contracts governing the buying and selling of the asset
to keep a stable price. While early stablecoins such as NuBits experimented
with this option, this is no longer prevalent, although algorithmic stablecoins
do exist.176
them through lawsuits.” Jared Whitley, Gensler’s Crypto Mess: It’s Time For Congress To Teach
The SEC What “Clarity” Means, CRYPTO LAW (Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.cryptolaw.us/genslers-crypto-mess-its-time-for-congress-to-teach-the-sec-what-clarity-means/
[https://perma.cc/WT6S-ULRC].
In September 2021, in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, SEC Chair Gensler
“pushed back on senators’ criticism that the SEC has been vague on when a crypto token is and isn’t
a security. ‘I think that there’s a fair amount of clarity over the years.’” Tomio Geron, Gary Gensler
Had a Lot to Say About Crypto in 2021, PROTOCOL (Dec. 26, 2021),
https://www.protocol.com/fintech/gary-gensler-crypto-wall-street [https://perma.cc/9JFW-7TNY].
The SEC’s Director of Enforcement has also characterized the SEC’s actions in the crypto space as
being based on “long-standing, well-known and understood regulations and standards that govern
the securities industry.” See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
175. James Burton, Bitcoin Is ‘More Volatile than Volatility Itself,’ WEALTH PRO. (May 20,
2021),
https://www.wealthprofessional.ca/investments/alternative-investments/bitcoin-is-morevolatile-than-volatility-itself/356352 [https://perma.cc/SH3V-A5AD] (quoting the CEO of
Horizons ETFs, Steve Hawkins, as having said that “Bitcoin is now the most volatile asset class in
the world”). For a further explanation of pricing volatility in crypto, see Cryptopedia Staff, Healthy
Volatility and Its Implications for Crypto Markets, CRYPTOPEDIA (June 28, 2022),
https://www.gemini.com/cryptopedia/volatility-index-crypto-market-price
[https://perma.cc/QHB8-HX45].
176. Stablecoins: The Complete Guide, Part I—Past & Present (2014–2019), COOLWALLET
(Sept. 22, 2019) [hereinafter CoolWallet Blog], https://www.coolwallet.io/the-complete-guide-tostablecoins-part-i-2014-2019/ [https://perma.cc/3XA9-8KJG]. In early May 2022, an algorithmic
stablecoin, UST or TerraUSD, imploded spectacularly, resulting in a spate of headlines and new
questions about the need to regulate this asset class. “Before May 10, TerraUSD was in the top 10
most valuable cryptocurrencies with an estimated market value of more than $40 billion. However,
a huge market crash sent the value tumbling (understatement) to $500 million, a drop of nearly 99
percent.” Oliver Povey, Cryptocurrency Prices: What Is the Correlation Between UST and Luna
that Explains Its Big Drop?, AS USA (May 16, 2022, 7:51 PM) (emphasis omitted),
https://en.as.com/latest_news/cryptocurrency-prices-what-is-the-correlation-between-ust-andluna-that-explains-its-big-drop-n/ [https://perma.cc/63BE-WC7K]. It appears that the “network as
it once was can’t be salvaged.” Daniel Kuhn, UST Won’t Be the End of Algorithmic Stablecoins,
COINDESK (May 16, 2022, 2:14 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/layer2/2022/05/16/ust-wont-bethe-end-of-algorithmic-stablecoins/ [https://perma.cc/UFK5-P6LR]; see also Matt Phillips, Broken
Stablecoin Could Intensify Crypto Regulation Push, AXIOS (May 12, 2022),
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The first successful stablecoin, USDT (colloquially known as “Tether,”
which is also the name of the company that created it), was launched in 2014.
Originally called RealCoin, it was renamed USD Tether (“USDT”) in
November 2014, and it began trading on exchanges in early 2015.177 The
original concept was that each USDT would be backed by one U.S. dollar,
although Tether Limited has also maintained that it is not contractually
obligated to guarantee that USDT can be redeemed or exchanged for dollars
or other fiat.178 In the absence of external audits, and with rumors circulating
that Tether was not maintaining sufficient reserves, USDT dropped below $1
in October 2018,179 although the price recovered relatively quickly and has
stayed close to $1 since that time.
Subsequent investigations have demonstrated that Tether falsely
claimed that USDT was fully backed by U.S. dollars, and for years denied
any connection to Bitfinex, when in fact both companies are owned by
iFinex.180 Later developments indicated that each USDT was at best backed
at 74% of its stated value, and not primarily by U.S. dollars.181 In addition,
the parent company, iFinex, secretly used some of its reserves to cover an
$850 million loss that Tether did not disclose to the public.182

https://www.axios.com/2022/05/12/broken-stablecoin-could-intensify-crypto-regulation-push
[https://perma.cc/AC5M-43JW].
177. David Hamilton, What Is Tether? Everything You Need to Know, SECURITIES.IO (Mar. 20,
2022),
https://www.securities.io/what-is-tether-a-look-at-the-worlds-most-popular-stablecoin/
[https://perma.cc/5KVQ-AKAD].
178. David Dinkins, The Strange Story of Tether, the Digital Money That Claims it Isn’t Money,
COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 17, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-strange-story-of-tether-thedigital-money-that-claims-it-isnt-money [https://perma.cc/F7U4-YDJB].
179. Gareth Jenkinson, Untethered: The History of Stablecoin Tether and How It Has Lost Its
$1 Peg, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 17, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/untethered-the-historyof-stablecoin-tether-and-how-it-has-lost-its-1-peg
[https://perma.cc/2PMP-8L4S].
Historical
pricing information about USDT can be obtained at Historical Data for Tether, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether/historical-data/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2022). While
USDT did drop to $0.9771 on October 17, 2018, it was again trading at $1.00 in early December of
that year. Id.
180. Jordan Atkins, Crypto Crime Cartel: The End Is Nigh for Tether, COINGEEK (Jan. 15,
2021),
https://coingeek.com/crypto-crime-cartel-the-end-is-nigh-for-tether/
[https://perma.cc/YGP7-XRN7]. Bitfinex had previously been the subject of CFTC enforcement
actions for illegal off-exchange commodity transactions and failure to register as a futures
commission merchant. CFTC Orders Bitcoin Exchange Bitfinex to Pay $75,000 for Offering Illegal
Off-Exchange Financed Retail Commodity Transactions and Failing to Register as a Futures
Commission
Merchant,
CFTC,
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/7380-16
[https://perma.cc/2MPT-RDCS] (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
181. Id.
182. Paul Vigna, Bitfinex Used Tether Reserves to Mask Missing $850 Million, Probe Says,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2019, 11:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitfinex-used-tetherreserves-to-mask-missing-850-million-probe-finds-11556227031. As described in this story, the
New York Attorney General’s office leveled these accusations as part of its investigation against
Bitfinex and its parent, iFinex. Id.
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These actions led to an enforcement action not by the SEC, but by the
New York Attorney General’s office which was finally settled in February
2021, with iFinex agreeing to pay an $18.5 million fine without admitting
wrongdoing.183 In addition, on May 13, 2021, Tether complied with other
requirements of the New York settlement order by releasing the asset
breakdown for its reserves, indicating that cash accounted for only 2.9% of
the reserves, while the company relied on commercial paper and fiduciary
deposits that may be illiquid or insecure for the bulk of its backing.184
While there have been hints that the SEC might be investigating
Tether,185 in the absence of any actual action, in October 2021, the CFTC
announced an order that both initiated and settled “charges against Tether
Holdings Limited, Tether Limited, Tether Operations Limited, and Tether
International Limited (d/b/a Tether)” for lying about the USDT (Tether)
stablecoin.186 The most important allegations against Tether involved a
pattern of deceit about the way in which the stablecoin was supposed to be
backed. The order included the following findings:
Tether misrepresented to customers and the market that Tether
maintained sufficient U.S. dollar reserves to back every USDT in
circulation with the “equivalent amount of corresponding fiat
currency” held by Tether and “safely deposited” in Tether’s bank
accounts. In fact Tether reserves were not “fully-backed” the
majority of the time. The order further finds that Tether failed to
disclose that it included unsecured receivables and non-fiat assets
in its reserves, and that Tether falsely represented that it would
undergo routine, professional audits . . . .187
Even in the face of these legal actions, USDT continues to be very
actively traded. According to CoinMarketCap, the circulating supply of
183. Duncan Riley, iFinex Agrees to Pay $18.5M to Settle New York Tether Lawsuit,
SILICONANGLE (Feb. 23, 2021, 9:45 PM), https://siliconangle.com/2021/02/23/ifinex-agrees-pay18-5m-settle-new-york-tether-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/48D3-3RUC].
184. ValExplorer, Should We Worry About Tether?, MEDIUM (May 19, 2021),
https://medium.com/coinmonks/should-we-worry-about-tether-1fc1727ebe4c
[https://perma.cc/Q4DG-MXKM].
185. Nikhilesh De, SEC Hints at Tether Probe in Records Request Denial, COINDESK (Sept. 24,
2021, 2:42 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/09/24/sec-hints-at-tether-probe-inrecords-request-denial/ [https://perma.cc/54DW-H3B5]. The SEC declined to release records about
Tether in response to a FOIA request from Jacob Silverman, a staff writer at The New Republic, on
the grounds that they were collected for enforcement purposes. A copy of the SEC’s letter denying
the request can be accessed at Tether Stablecoin Company (Securities and Exchange Commission),
MUCKROCK,
https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/tether-stablecoincompany-securities-and-exchange-commission-118568/#file-972087 (last visited Oct. 4, 2022).
186. CFTC Orders Tether and Bitfinex to Pay Fines Totaling $42.5 Million, CFTC (Oct. 15,
2021)
(emphasis
omitted),
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8450-21
[https://perma.cc/YL9E-BC2H]. At the same time, Bitfinex was ordered to pay $1.5 million for
illegal transactions while it operated the Bitfinex crypto exchange. Id.
187. Id.
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USDT as of August 7, 2022, exceeded sixty-six billion tokens.188 The same
source listed a twenty-four-hour trading volume on that day of almost thirtytwo billion USDT.189
The real question is what it means for the SEC to have abstained from
any action against a repeated pattern of apparently deceptive behavior by the
companies responsible for the most heavily traded stablecoin.190 If the SEC
is being truthful in its claim that it has clear and broad authority, does this
inactivity mean that stablecoins are outside the purview of the SEC? We do
not really know.
On November 1, 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency jointly issued a report on stablecoins.191 This
report unhelpfully notes that “stablecoin arrangements and activities may
implicate the jurisdiction of the SEC and/or CFTC.”192 While concluding that
there are gaps in existing regulations that suggest the need for congressional
action, the report neither explains the extent of the SEC’s jurisdiction nor the
extent to which gaps exist with regard to issues of investor protection or
market integrity, instead focusing on prudential regulation of stablecoin
issuers.193
SEC Chair Gensler has also been less than clear in his assessment of
stablecoins. In July 2021, he said in remarks to the American Bar Association
188. Today’s
Cryptocurrency
Prices
by
Market
Cap,
COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/tether (last visited Aug. 7, 2022) (reporting that Tether’s
market capitalization as of that day was $66.48 billion).
189. Id. (listing a 24-hour trading volume of 31.82 billion USDT on August 7, 2022). While
some sources recently questioned the accuracy of reported high trading volumes of cryptoassets,
data aggregators such as CoinMarketCap have responded by improving their analytic processes.
Anupam Varshney, Telling the Truth? How Crypto Data Aggregators Fight Fake Exchange
Volumes, COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 5, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/telling-the-truth-howcrypto-data-aggregators-fight-fake-exchange-volumes (explaining some of the improvements made
by crypto data aggregators). CoinGecko, another aggregator using different metrics, reported a
twenty-four-hour trading volume as of August 7, 2022, of 34.21 billion USDT, which is even higher
than the volume reported by CoinMarketCap. Cryptocurrency Prices by Market Cap, COINGECKO,
https://www.coingecko.com/ [https://perma.cc/6L5C-24UD] (last visited Aug. 7, 2022).
190. USDT has become so important to the crypto ecosystem that a number of observers have
expressed concern that it poses a possible systemic risk to the entire crypto market. Elizabeth
Lopatto, The Tether Controversy Explained, VERGE (Aug. 16, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/22620464/tether-backing-cryptocurrency-stablecoin.
191. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS. ET AL., INTERAGENCY REPORT ON
STABLECOINS
(2021)
[hereinafter
STABLECOIN
REPORT],
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/StableCoinReport_Nov1_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WG3-PA5T].
192. Id. at 11.
193. “This report focuses on analyzing prudential risks posed by stablecoins used as a means of
payment and provides recommendations for addressing these gaps.” Id. at 2. Footnote 2, which
follows this statement, confirms that the “report does not provide recommendations regarding issues
or risks under the federal securities laws.” Id. at 2 n.2.
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that stablecoins whose value was pegged to securities “might” themselves be
securities.194 He did not include stablecoins pegged to a fiat currency such as
the U.S. dollar in this analysis. In remarks before the Aspen Security Forum
in August 2021, he suggested that “stablecoins also may be securities.”195 In
testimony before a Senate hearing in September 2021, in response to a
question from Pennsylvania Senator Patrick Toomey about whether
stablecoins were securities, he said only that “they may well be.”196 During a
Washington Post interview, also in September 2021, when it came to
stablecoins, Gensler said “the agency still needs to coordinate with other
financial regulators to ensure they aren’t letting any matters fall through the
cracks, while also working with Congress ‘to sort through that.’”197 These
statements do not sound as if the SEC’s authority to regulate stablecoins is
clear.
The lack of clarity over how the SEC views stablecoins is particularly
important given the market capitalization of stablecoins that are widely
available in the United States and pegged to the U.S. dollar. Tether is hugely
important in the crypto space.198 In addition, the United States Dollar Coin
(“USDC”), originally launched in September 2016 by Coinbase and Circle,199
had 11.5 billion coins in circulation as of April 8, 2021.200 Other fiat-backed
stablecoins with a value tied to the U.S. dollar include TrueUSD, Paxos
Standard, and Gemini Dollar.201 The DAI stablecoin, an Ethereum-based
194. Nikhilesh De, SEC Chair Hints Some Stablecoins Are Securities, NASDAQ (July 21, 2021,
12:17 PM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/sec-chair-hints-some-stablecoins-are-securities-202107-21.
195. Gensler Remarks, supra note 76.
196. Daren Fonda, The SEC May Be Coming for Stablecoins, While Congress Aims to Treat
Cryptos
More
Like
Stocks,
BARRON’S
(Sept.
15,
2021,
12:57
PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-stablecoins-regulation-51631724992
[https://perma.cc/3AG7-74KE]. Representative Toomey suggested that to him “a stablecoin doesn’t
meet the second prong of the Howey Test, that there has to be an expectation of profits from the
investment . . . [i]f it doesn’t meet the Howey Test, it looks . . . like it’s not a security.” Michael
Bacina & Jade McGlynn, Blockchain Bites: Stablecoins as Securities?, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 27, 2021)
(first
and
second
alterations
in
original),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1143fe94-7912-4ccc-bf64-8935859d8b6c.
Gensler did not address the reasoning in Toomey’s inquiry.
197. Tory Newmyer, SEC’s Gensler Likens Stablecoins to ‘Poker Chips’ Amid Call for Tougher
Crypto
Regulation,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
21,
2021,
3:17
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/09/21/sec-gensler-crypto-stablecoins/
[https://perma.cc/H3TP-PAR2].
198. “As the dominant stablecoin used in Bitcoin and cryptocurrency trading, Tether has become
hugely important.” Jasper Lawler, What Is Tether? | Using Stablecoins | Is USDT a Bitcoin Scam?,
FLOWBANK (June 9, 2021), https://www.flowbank.com/en/learning-center/what-is-tether-usingstablecoins-is-usdt-a-bitcoin-scam [https://perma.cc/P6BZ-NBRY].
199. USD Coin, CIRCLE, https://www.circle.com/en/usdc (last visited August 7, 2022).
200. Id.
201. Becky, What Is a Fiat-Backed Stablecoin?, COIN INSIDER (July 9, 2021),
https://www.coininsider.com/what-is-a-fiat-backed-stablecoin/ [https://perma.cc/VGT2-WPG9].
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decentralized stablecoin,202 “maintains its peg by users who provide an overcollateralization in Ethereum (more than $1 in value) which they can redeem
later.”203 BitShares is another decentralized stablecoin pegged to but not
directly backed by the U.S. dollar.204
In the absence of any regulations or even official guidance on the issue
of how stablecoins should be classified under the securities laws,
entrepreneurs working with stablecoins are left to wait for the SEC to initiate
enforcement actions in order to ascertain how the securities might be applied
to their operations. This is the essence of regulation by enforcement, and the
damage that it is doing to an emerging technology of significant potential is
significant.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT
One of the problems that regulation by enforcement can encourage is a
tendency to over-regulate. The federal Administrative Procedures Act of
1946205 (“APA”) was specifically designed to operate as a check on the power
of administrative agencies, to ensure not only uniformity in procedures but
also to limit the power of administrative agencies that might otherwise act in
excess of their statutory authority.206 Administrative actions that are arbitrary
or capricious can be set aside,207 and failing to observe notice and comment
requirements that give the public an opportunity to provide input to a
proposed action is grounds for overturning such an action.208 While the scope

202. The Maker Protocol: MakerDAO’s Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) System, MAKERDAO,
https://makerdao.com/en/whitepaper/#abstract [https://perma.cc/PZ2F-B8BG] (last visited Aug. 9,
2022).
203. CoolWallet Blog, supra note 176.
204. Aaron Mangal, What Is Bitshares? The Ultimate Guide for Beginners, COINCENTRAL
(Nov. 12, 2017), https://coincentral.com/what-is-bitshares/ [https://perma.cc/YMG2-3C4X].
205. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (governing
agency rulemaking and adjudication).
206. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950) (“The Administrative Procedure
Act was framed against a background of rapid expansion of the administrative process as a check
upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in
legislation creating their offices.”); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303 (1979)
(“[A]gency discretion is limited not only by substantive, statutory grants of authority, but also by
the procedural requirements which ‘assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general
application.’” (quoting Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969))).
207. 2 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S., ITS AGENCIES, OFFICERS & EMPS. Action arbitrary,
capricious, abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law § 6:40, Westlaw (database updated
Mar. 2022).
208. The Supreme Court has found that an agency’s failure to explain its failure to comply with
notice and comment requires a rule to be vacated. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804,
1809, 1810 (2019) (although the case involved a “statement of policy,” the Court found that the
announcement in question should have followed notice and comment).
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and application of the APA is far outside the scope of this Article,209 the
underlying values that it is based upon are useful for evaluating why
congressional action is so important for the future of the crypto ecosystem.
The SEC has so far declined to initiate formal rulemaking in regard to
cryptoassets, instead relying on non-binding statements by individual
officials210 and complicated frameworks211 that may or may not apply in any
given situation. This has meant that the SEC has not needed to observe the
normal notice and comment procedures required of formal rulemaking.212
The lack of opportunity for input or comment on potential
administrative decisions increases the likelihood that important information
might be overlooked or the cost of a particular interpretation
underestimated.213 Others have noted the tendency of SEC officials to make
generalizations, falsely suggesting that crypto is increasingly rife with
fraud.214 According to some sources, such assumptions “fly in the face of
209. For example, one could look at the SEC DAO Report and subsequent Framework and ask
whether those documents are intended by the SEC to be so substantively binding that they should
have been subject to notice and comment under the “practically binding” doctrine. For a discussion
of the parameters of that rule, see Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy
Statements and Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 496 (2016). See also
Nicholas R. Parrillo, Should the Public Get to Participate Before Federal Agencies Issue Guidance?
An Empirical Study, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2019) (noting widespread calls to make the process
by which agencies issue guidance more participatory).
210. For some of the recent statements by Chair Gensler, see supra notes 1–9 and accompanying
text.
211. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 43.
212. Interpretive rules and guidance are exempt from the notice and comment requirement under
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). Because the SEC so far has claimed to be limiting its remarks and guidance
to interpreting pre-existing rules, the existing pronouncements have been made with no opportunity
for advance comment.
213. Deserai A. Crow, Elizabeth A. Albright & Elizabeth Koebele, Evaluating Informational
Inputs in Rulemaking Processes: A Cross-Case Analysis, ADMIN. & SOC’Y ONLINE 1, 4 (2015)
https://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2015.22.pdf (“[P]rocesses that sit
outside the notice and comment period may diminish inclusiveness, transparency, and
standardization of the overarching rulemaking process . . . .”).
214. In response to August 3, 2021, comments from SEC Chair Gensler claiming that crypto
markets are “rife with fraud,” Kristin Smith of the Blockchain Association in Washington explained,
“Where we differ with Chair Gensler is his characterization of the growing crypto economy as the
‘Wild West’ . . . . The crypto industry is far from unregulated.” Katanga Johnson, U.S. SEC Chair
Gensler Calls on Congress to Help Rein in Crypto ‘Wild West’, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2021, 6:43 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-sec-chair-gensler-calls-congress-help-rein-crypto-wildwest-2021-08-03/.
Analytic data suggests that the amount of fraud in the crypto space is not as great as Gensler
and others have suggested. The blockchain data platform Chainalysis prepares annual reports
evaluating the rates of crypto-related crime since 2019. Reports, CHAINALYSIS,
https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/ [https://perma.cc/2ZG9-E2DC] (last visited Oct. 4, 2022)
(containing a list of the company’s reports). Its 2021 report found that, as a percent of all
cryptocurrency activity, scams and other illicit activity accounted for 0.34% by value, as compared
to 2.1% of transactions in 2019. CHAINALYSIS, THE 2021 CRYPTO CRIME REPORT 5 (2021),
https://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP-074/images/Chainalysis-Crypto-Crime-2021.pdf
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established investigative and forensics analysis of cryptocurrency
transactions, showing only a minute proportion of the overall volume being
linked to illicit activities. Also, crypto is used far less with criminal intent
when compared with traditional financial methods.”215
The risk that the SEC might choose a particularly aggressive
enforcement strategy seems borne out by recent actions, including the
lawsuits brought against Kik, Telegram, and Ripple.216 Crypto entrepreneurs
must operate in the face of uncertainty and with the knowledge that their
actions may be challenged by the SEC years after the fact.217 Crypto
entrepreneurs must either risk that they or their businesses may later face
substantial penalties218 or forego operating in the United States.
There is some evidence that crypto entrepreneurs are succumbing to the
pressure to do business elsewhere, with the corresponding reality that U.S.
investors who would like to participate in some market initiatives are
precluded from doing so. For example, in the first quarter of 2019, eighty-six
public sales of new cryptoassets were specifically structured to exclude
American purchasers, making the United States the single country most
likely to be excluded from crypto offerings, followed by North Korea, Iran,
and Syria.219 Major crypto exchanges exclude U.S. customers, to the
confusion and disappointment of many.220 In the fall of 2021, after receiving
[https://perma.cc/V5LM-LDKS]. The downward trend for illicit activity as a percent of overall
transactions has continued, as documented in the company’s 2022 report. CHAINALYSIS, THE 2022
CRYPTO CRIME REPORT 3 (2022), https://go.chainalysis.com/rs/503-FAP-074/images/CryptoCrime-Report-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9J-4TL9].
215. Osato Avan-Nomayo, Regulatory and Privacy Concerns Trail SEC’s Threat to Coinbase,
COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 12, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/regulatory-and-privacyconcerns-trail-sec-s-threat-to-coinbase [https://perma.cc/2STC-WXM8].
216. See supra Sections III.A–C.
217. The Ripple enforcement action, for example, was brought about seven years after the XRP
token was first issued. See supra Section III.C.
218. The SEC’s activity in the crypto enforcement sphere has been demonstrably more
aggressive than that taken in any other jurisdiction. For a comparative analysis of how the SEC’s
enforcement actions stack up against enforcement in other countries, see Douglas S. Eakeley &
Yuliya Guseva, Crypto-Enforcement Around the World, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 99 (2021).
These researchers conclude their “data unequivocally demonstrate that the U.S. regulators, the SEC
and the CFTC, have been singularly active in commencing enforcement actions against a variety of
crypto-firms.” Id. at 127. Of particular note is the $18.5 million fine assessed against Telegram,
alongside the requirement that it disgorge $1.224 billion in proceeds from the first stage of its
offering. Id. at 119, 125.
219. Lukas Hofer, Why Token Issuers Exclude U.S. Investors, ICO.LI (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://ico.li/us-investors/ [https://perma.cc/JUB8-MCTF].
220. “The U.S. remains a challenging environment for centralized cryptocurrency exchanges,
with major players significantly scaling back their operations and others heading for the door.” Kai
Sedgwick, As Crypto Exchanges Exit the US, Which Trading Platforms Will Enter the Breach?,
BITCOIN.COM (Oct. 24, 2019), https://news.bitcoin.com/as-crypto-exchanges-exit-the-us-whichtrading-platforms-will-enter-the-breach/ [https://perma.cc/N6S6-TZH3]; see also Benjamin Pirus,
Crypto Exchanges Barring US Citizens Is Heartbreaking and Frustrating, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2020,
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a Wells Notice221 from the SEC, Coinbase shut down a planned crypto
lending program that would have offered U.S. participants interest on their
deposits of USDC at rates substantially higher than those offered for cash
deposited with conventional financial institutions.222 Coinbase subsequently
chose to pursue a substitute lending program that will exclude U.S.
participants.223 On February 14, 2022, the SEC also shut down the BlockFi
lending program for U.S. participants.224 There are additional lending
programs that also exclude U.S. participants.225
Unfortunately, there is no indication that the SEC intends to back away
from its recent approach to cryptoasset regulation. It made no public
announcements regarding planned rulemaking relating to cryptoassets prior
to the end of 2021 and continued to initiate new enforcement actions
throughout the last months of that year.226 The SEC has considerable
8:03 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminpirus/2020/09/30/crypto-exchanges-barring-uscitizens-is-heartbreaking-and-frustrating/?sh=18e3f7527c97 (“Part of the difficulty lies in the
uncertainty. I am not a legal professional, so I do not know exactly why I am banned from using the
top exchanges in the industry. Other average folks likely feel the same.”).
221. A Wells Notice is “a notification from a regulator that it intends to recommend that
enforcement proceedings be commenced against the prospective respondent. The notice references,
in broad-strokes, the violation that the Staff believes has occurred.” Mark Astarita, The Wells Notice
SEC/FINRA Investigations, SECLAW.COM, https://www.seclaw.com/wells-notice-sec-finrainvestigations/ [https://perma.cc/B72K-S9GV] (last visited June 26, 2022).
222. Paul Grewal, The SEC Has Told Us It Wants to Sue Us over Lend. We Don’t Know Why.,
COINBASE (Sept. 7, 2021), https://blog.coinbase.com/the-sec-has-told-us-it-wants-to-sue-us-overlend-we-have-no-idea-why-a3a1b6507009 [https://perma.cc/TTC5-6ELJ].
223. On December 9, 2021, Coinbase announced on its blog that it would enable “eligible
customers in more than 70 countries to access the attractive yields of DeFi from their Dai with no
fees, lockups, or set-up hassle.” Rhea Kaw, Coinbase Makes It Easy to Earn Yield with DeFi,
COINBASE (Dec. 9, 2021), https://blog.coinbase.com/coinbase-makes-it-easy-to-earn-yield-withdefi-bd38156e2715 [https://perma.cc/J5RR-S2N3].
224. BlockFi Agrees to Pay $100 Million in Penalties and Pursue Registration of Its Crypto
Lending Product, SEC (Feb. 14, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-26
[https://perma.cc/28XX-889E]. Despite shutting down the program for U.S. participants, BlockFi’s
program continues to be available to other customers. See Update to BlockFi Interest Account (BIA)
Rates, BLOCKFI (Feb. 25, 2022), https://blockfi.com/march-update-to-blockfi-interest-account-biarates [https://perma.cc/LY5U-EHPB].
225. For a discussion of crypto lending programs that exclude U.S. participants, see Crypto
Lending in the United States, SELFKEY (June 12, 2020), https://selfkey.org/crypto-lending-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/ZY6S-T6K8].
226. See SEC Charges Issuers and CEO for $18 Million Illegal Securities Offering, SEC (Sept.
8, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2021/lr25198.htm [https://perma.cc/XGG969PZ] (relating to Complaint, SEC v. Rivetz Corp., No. 3:21-cv-30092 (D. Mass. Sept. 8, 2021));
SEC Charges Three Media Companies with Illegal Offerings of Stock and Digital Assets, SEC (Sept.
13, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-175 [https://perma.cc/GGF7-8P8U]
(relating to GTV Media Group, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (SEC Sept. 13, 2021), and
requiring defendants to pay more than $539 million to settle the charges); SEC Charges Promoter
with Conducting Cryptocurrency Investment Scams, SEC (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-237 [https://perma.cc/5LJ5-V9NS] (relating to
Complaint, SEC v. Ginster, No. 5:21-cv-01957 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2021)); SEC Charges Latvian
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resources at its disposal,227 which are likely to far exceed the amounts that
most defendants who are likely to be targeted will have available to expend
on responding to any administrative or court actions. This disparity means
that the strategy of initiating actions or even threatening them can be very
effective while never resulting in binding appellate precedents.228
The fact that the SEC has substantial resources at its disposal does not
mean that it can initiate unlimited actions. As recognized in the Division of
Enforcement’s Manual, the SEC must make choices about how to allocate its
resources.229 This reality, especially combined with confusion about what the
law means, is certain to reduce the value and efficacy of the agency in seeking
to advance its mission.
When neither entrepreneurs nor the public understand the law, the risk
is that everyone’s behavior will be directed in non-optimal ways that do a
poor job of protecting investors, do not increase trust in the financial markets,
and actually impede capital formation in the burgeoning crypto ecosystem.
When the law is uncertain and the risk of an enforcement action is low or
uncertain, the potential for deterrence is also impacted negatively.230 As
articulated in groundbreaking work back in the 1980s, legal uncertainty
creates conflicting incentives for over- and under-deterrence.231 Both results
can be seen in the crypto ecosystem, as persons acting in bad faith continue
to operate, perhaps assuming (or hoping) that they will escape detection or

Citizen With Digital Asset Fraud, SEC (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2021-248 [https://perma.cc/98SR-ME6V] (relating to Complaint, SEC v. Auzins, No. 1:21cv-06693 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2021)).
227. The SEC’s 2022 budget request sought funding for 1,330 positions in the Division of
Enforcement, with a budget of nearly $640 million. SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2022 CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET JUSTIFICATION ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 23 (2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/fy2022-congressional-budget-justification-annual-performance-plan_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GX8X-XNSE]. The SEC’s total budget request was for $1.993 billion to support
the equivalent of 4,658 full-time positions. Id. at 2.
228. See supra note 104 (settlement in the Kik action that resulted in decision not to appeal) and
149 (settlement in the Telegram action that resulted in dismissal of the appeal).
229. DIV.
ENF’T,
SEC,
ENFORCEMENT
MANUAL
4
(2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UPK9-6NUL]
(discussing the need to devote “appropriate resources to investigations that are more significant”).
230. A full discussion of deterrence and the voluminous academic discourse on the topic is far
outside the scope of this Article. However, there seems to be general agreement that “[t]he potential
efficacy of deterrence policies is further hampered by the low risk of punishment.” PAUL H.
ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE
PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 128 (2006).
231. Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). These scholars’ key conclusion was that legal uncertainty creates
conflicting incentives for both over- and under-deterrence. Id. at 279–80; accord STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 93–97 (1987) (reaching a similar conclusion with respect
to the level of due care exercised by market participants when the law is uncertain).
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censure, and persons acting in good faith remove themselves from the United
States, depriving interested participants of potentially valuable opportunities.
V. A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
The preceding discussion demonstrates that the existing response by the
SEC to the rapid growth in cryptoassets has been primarily through
enforcement, rather than by establishing new, clearer rules to govern what
appears to be a novel asset class with unique characteristics.232 The problems
with this approach have also been described. Because the SEC shows every
indication of continuing along the same path for the foreseeable future, it
seems clear that congressional action is needed. Even SEC Chair Gensler has,
at times, called for additional clarification from Congress.233
Obviously, Congress might choose to act in ways that are themselves
suboptimal. Just as SEC Chair Gensler has repeatedly warned about the risk
of fraud,234 others have also expressed strong reservations about crypto
generally. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) has been particularly
vocal in expressing her opinions about cryptoassets. In a prepared statement
from July 2021, she claimed that “[w]hile demand for cryptocurrencies and
the use of cryptocurrency exchanges have sky-rocketed, the lack of commonsense regulations has left ordinary investors at the mercy of manipulators and
fraudsters. These regulatory gaps endanger consumers and investors and
undermine the safety of our financial markets.”235
On the other side of the issue, there are also clear crypto supporters.
Senator Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyoming) is reportedly in favor of what she
calls “light-touch regulation.”236 Lummis also says that “[w]e want the
innovators to innovate. We want to create a space where the United States is
the leader in opportunity for the creation and use of digital assets.”237 Senator
Patrick Toomey (R-Pennsylvania) has characterized distributed ledger

232. See, e.g., Carol R. Goforth, Cinderella’s Slipper: A Better Approach to Regulating
Cryptoassets as Securities, 17 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 271, 305–06 (2021) (explaining how the novelty
of cryptoassets makes the current regulatory approach and disclosures overly burdensome and less
than helpful to potential purchasers).
233. For example, in August 2021, he was quoted as having asked for “additional congressional
authorities to prevent transactions, products, and platforms from falling between regulatory cracks.”
David Gura, A Big Fight Is Brewing over Cryptocurrencies. These Are Some Key Players to Watch,
NPR (Nov. 6, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/06/1050430801/cryptocurrenciesbitcoin-elizabeth-warren-gary-gensler [https://perma.cc/UJM3-22JH].
234. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
235. Ajibola Akamo, US Senator Elizabeth Warren Gives SEC Ultimatum to Regulate
Cryptocurrency Trading, NAIRAMETRICS (July 9, 2021), https://nairametrics.com/2021/07/09/ussenator-elizabeth-warren-gives-sec-ultimatum-to-regulate-cryptocurrency-trading/.
236. Gura, supra note 233.
237. Id.
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technology behind cryptoassets as a “powerful technological innovation.”238
In the House, Representative Warren Davidson (R-Ohio) has expressed
concern that Congress is moving too slowly in providing guidance to the
crypto entrepreneurs. One source quotes Davidson as saying: “Industry is
basically pleading, ‘Give us some regulatory clarity.’”239
Despite these clear differences of opinion among congressional leaders,
there is some indication that sentiment may be increasingly shifting towards
a lighter regulatory response. A December 8, 2021, hearing before the House
Financial Services Committee specifically considered how the U.S.
government should improve crypto regulations:
The general sentiment of the hearing was positive towards the
cryptocurrency industry, a dramatic shift from past years. This
disposition surprised some, but it reflects an evolving view of the
benefits of cryptocurrency technology and the fear that the US is
falling behind other countries such as China that have made
noticeable progress towards launching a sovereign digital
currency.240
Not surprisingly, most of the six witnesses (all of whom were chief
executive officers of successful crypto operations) called for greater clarity
in the way the industry is being regulated, particularly by the SEC.241
Potentially adding to the impetus for action, on March 9, 2022, President
Biden signed an executive order setting national priorities for the
development and regulation of cryptoassets (called digital assets in the
order).242 The document is described by the White House as “outlining the
first ever, whole-of-government approach to addressing the risks and
harnessing the potential benefits of digital assets and their underlying
technology.”243 The order itself lists a number of national objectives for
cryptoassets, including both protection of consumers and investors and for
financial stability, as well as promotion of “responsible development and use

238. Daniel Moore, Sen. Toomey Buys into Crypto Craze, Praising Potential of Technology
Driving Digital Currency, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 27, 2021, 5:48 PM),
https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-nation/2021/07/27/Pat-Toomey-cryptocurrencybitcoin-memestock-banking-committee/stories/202107270021 [https://perma.cc/A7ZR-8N32].
239. Gura, supra note 233.
240. Hailey Lennon, Capitol Hill Warms Up to Crypto, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2021, 10:15 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/haileylennon/2021/12/09/capitol-hill-warms-up-tocrypto/?sh=5921d535790c [https://perma.cc/4ESR-TBRA].
241. Id.
242. Exec. Order No. 14067, 87 Fed. Reg. 14,143 (Mar. 14, 2022).
243. Fact Sheet: President Biden to Sign Executive Order on Ensuring Responsible Development
of Digital Assets, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/03/09/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-onensuring-responsible-innovation-in-digital-assets/ [https://perma.cc/SP2L-AFHG].
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of digital assets.”244 Rather than calling for congressional action, however,
the order focuses on interagency coordination involving an extensive number
of participants with reports being required from many of them, acting in a
coordinated fashion.245
While the executive order certainly acknowledges that the current state
of regulation is inadequate, it stops short of recognizing the need for
congressional action.246 Some commentators have suggested that this means
that “[t]he executive order is unlikely to result in significant legislation that
can pass both houses of Congress and be signed into law.”247 Others,
however, suggest that the result may be exactly the kind of comprehensive
legislation that the industry has been seeking.248 In fact, some members of
Congress are working on such initiatives.249
The possibility of congressional action that clarifies the regulatory
treatment of cryptoassets in a balanced way is therefore realistic, although by
no means certain. While there are many options that would be an
improvement over the current system, here are some suggestions for
clarification moving forward. The remainder of this Part discusses potential
solutions to cryptoasset regulation that would clarify agency authority and
offer crypto businesses more certainty in their ongoing operations.

244. Exec. Order No. 14,067, 87 Fed. Reg. 14,145 (Mar. 14, 2022).
245. Id. at 14,147–49.
246. “In an executive order signed on Wednesday, the White House called on agencies across
the government to coordinate what’s thus far been a scatter-shot approach to the asset class.
However, it falls short of providing clear direction on regulation.” Allyson Versprille, Biden Pushes
for Coordinated Approach to Crypto Oversight, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2022, 12:31 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-09/biden-pushes-for-more-coordinatedapproach-to-crypto-oversight [https://perma.cc/K554-8LHQ].
247. Biden Executive Order on Cryptocurrencies and Other Digital Assets Emphasizes
Innovation
and
Regulation,
COOLEY
(Mar.
16,
2022),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2022/2022-03-16-biden-executive-order-oncryptocurrencies [https://perma.cc/FVV7-MEPX].
248. Caitlin Mullen, Biden’s Digital Asset Order May Prompt Legislation, PAYMENTS DIVE
(Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.paymentsdive.com/news/bidens-digital-asset-order-may-promptlegislation/620219/ [https://perma.cc/X3VK-TM23].
249. For example, Senators Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyoming) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-New
York) introduced a bipartisan bill covering a wide range of topics relating to crypto regulation on
June 7, 2022. “Lummis-Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act,” S. 4356, 117th Cong.
(2022), https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s4356/BILLS-117s4356is.pdf. On August 3, 2022,
another bipartisan bill was introduced by U.S. Senators Debbie Stabenow (D-Michigan) and John
Boozman (R-Arkansas), along with Senators Cory Booker (D-New Jersey) and John Thune (RSouth Dakota). Their bill would give the CFTC authority to regulate spot markets in cryptoassets
that are not securities. Digital Commodities Consumer Protection Act of 2022, S. 4760, 117th Cong.
(2022),
https://republicansagriculture.house.gov/uploadedfiles/digital_commodity_exchange_act_of_2022.pdf.
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A. A Coherent Classification Scheme
First, it would be helpful to have an idea of how the law classifies
tokens. An important study by the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance
concluded that “[a] major impediment to the analysis and the formulation of
clear policies for the emerging cryptoasset and blockchain industry is the lack
of clear and common terminology. A variety of terms are used, often
interchangeably and without a clear definition.”250
An excellent first step would be to divide tokens into something like the
following general categories: (1) currency or payment tokens; (2) securities
tokens; and (3) utility tokens.251 While slightly different nomenclature is
used, this is similar to the classification scheme applied in Wyoming, which
classifies a “digital asset” as either digital consumer assets (rather like utility
tokens),252 digital securities,253 or “virtual currency” (which is a form of
crypto that is “a medium of exchange, unit of account or store of value” but
not legal tender in the United States).254
While uniformity in how cryptoassets are classified would be ideal, it
should be noted that this approach would not be identical to the approach
currently being advocated for the European Union. The European Union’s
Regulation on Markets in Financial Instruments, known as MiFID II, 255
governs some types of financial instruments including cryptoassets that have
that function, while a new proposal, Markets in Crypto Assets (“MiCA”),
discusses regulation of utility tokens, asset-referenced tokens, and e-money
tokens.256 The E.U. Council presidency and the European Parliament
announced a provisional agreement on the MiCA proposal on June 30, 2022,
250. APOLLINE BLANDIN ET AL., GLOBAL CRYPTOASSET REGULATORY LANDSCAPE STUDY,
CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN. 15, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/201904-ccaf-global-cryptoasset-regulatory-landscape-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8BH-ML7V].
251. This is not a novel categorization. See, e.g., What Is the Difference Between Utility, Security
and Payment Tokens?, PLANET COMPLIANCE, https://www.planetcompliance.com/what-is-thedifference-between-utility-security-and-payment-tokens/ [https://perma.cc/2KXW-ZAFN] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2022).
252. Under Wyoming law, “‘[d]igital consumer asset’ means a digital asset that is used or bought
primarily for consumptive, personal or household purposes,” although this is also the catch-all
category for assets that are not digital securities or virtual currency. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29101(a)(ii) (2021).
253. “‘Digital security’ means a digital asset which constitutes a security . . . but shall exclude
digital consumer assets and virtual currency . . . .” Id. § 34-29-101(a)(iii).
254. Id. § 34-29-101(a)(iv).
255. MiFID II, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-iiand-mifir [https://perma.cc/798T-3WLL] (last visited Aug. 9, 2022). This Regulation, which went
into effect in January 2018, regulates cryptoassets that serve as financial instruments.
256. See Werner Vermaak, MiCA (Updated July 2022): A Guide to the EU’s Proposed Markets
in Crypto-Assets Regulation, SYGNA BLOG (July 2022), https://www.sygna.io/blog/what-is-micamarkets-in-crypto-assets-eu-regulation-guide/ [https://perma.cc/9AFJ-R6HM]. MiCA specifically
excludes those cryptoassets that are regulated as financial instruments under MiFID II. Id.
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but there is a multi-year phase-in, and it has been noted that in the “absence
of an agreed upon, comprehensive taxonomy of crypto-assets, European
financial authorities follow a widely-accepted classification that
distinguishes tokens in three main classes: payment, utility and investment
tokens—based on the different functions that tokens can perform.”257 Thus,
the classification scheme outlined here would be a reasonable approximation
of a broad-based approach to understanding different kinds of cryptoassets
and the next inquiry would be how to regulate interests that fall into each of
these categories.
B. Relying on the SEC to Police Crypto Fraud
This Article suggests that all tokens, however classified, should to some
extent be regulated as securities. This approach avoids the lack of clarity
inherent in the current system. However, to avoid the perils of overregulation and concomitant stifling of innovation, the securities laws should
be amended to provide an exemption from registration (but not the anti-fraud
provisions) of federal law for cryptoassets other than those classified as
securities tokens.258 This would allow the SEC, the federal agency with the
most resources259 and the most extensive enforcement experience to date,260
to continue its role in protecting consumers and investors. As proposed in this
Article, fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative misconduct in connection
with the issuance and sale of cryptoassets, whether classified as currency

257. The announcement on the preliminary agreement can be found at Digital Finance:
Agreement Reached on European Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION
(June
30,
2022.
10:30
PM),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2022/06/30/digital-finance-agreement-reached-on-european-crypto-assets-regulationmica/ [https://perma.cc/GA2B-C9AQ]. Valeria Ferrari, The Regulation of Crypto-Assets in the
EU—Investment and Payment Tokens Under the Radar, 27 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMPAR. L.
325,
329
(2020),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1023263X20911538
[https://perma.cc/G9HG-RUJ6].
258. This approach is consistent with the exempted transactions provision of the ‘33 Act. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (exempting specified transactions from the requirements
of Section 77e).
259. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that the SEC requested a total
budget of nearly $2 billion for 2022). In contrast to this, the CFTC requested less than $400 million
for 2022. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2022 8
(2021),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/202105/CFTC_FY_2022_President_s_Budget_Final_Signed_05212021.pdf [https://perma.cc/26YET729]. FinCEN requested a total of just over $225.5 million for 2022. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION AND ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT 3 (2022), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/266/13.FinCEN-FY-2022-CJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/US48-4DDS].
260. “We find that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’ or
‘Commission’) brings more enforcement actions against digital-asset issuers, broker-dealers,
exchanges, and other crypto-market participants than any other major crypto-jurisdiction.” Eakeley
et al., supra note 218, at 99–100.
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tokens, security tokens, utility tokens, or otherwise, would still be subject to
SEC enforcement initiatives focused on fraudulent or manipulative
conduct.261
This approach would give the SEC clearer authority over all
cryptoassets, so that the agency would no longer have to argue about whether
a particular cryptoasset is or is not a security under the Howey test. It does
not, however, explain how other aspects of cryptoassets should be regulated.
As proposed here, that would depend on the kind of token being regulated.
C. Possible Approaches to Currency Tokens
Consider, for example, currency (or payment) tokens. This category
would presumably be defined to include cryptoassets whose only primary
functions are those associated with fiat currency (serving as a unit of account,
medium of exchange, or store of value).262 As financial instruments, at the
federal level, businesses involved in the transmission or exchange of such
assets would continue to be subject to the Bank Secrecy Act requirements as
administered by FinCEN.263
261. An exemption from registration would mean that an issuer need not comply with the
registration requirements of Section 5 of the ‘33 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
The anti-fraud provisions appear in other provisions including the ‘34 Act § 10(b). See Securities
Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (providing that it is illegal for any person to “use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe”). There is no statute
of limitations for actions brought by the SEC, even though Section 84 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 limits the right of private plaintiffs to bring claims more than two years after discovery of
the facts constituting fraud or more than five years after fraud. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 84,
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
262. See Michael Jünemann & Johannes Wirtz, Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Kreditwesen 1117–
21, 1222–26 (2018), translated in ICO: Legal Classification of Tokens: Part 3—Currency Token,
BIRD & BIRD 21–23 (June 2, 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2019/global/ico-legalclassification-of-tokens-3 [https://perma.cc/QQW2-DJL9] (explaining an early consideration of
what kinds of assets could be classified as currency (or payment) tokens).
263. FinCEN asserted authority over businesses engaged in the transmission of digital assets in
2013. FINCEN, FIN-2019-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS
MODELS
INVOLVING
CONVERTIBLE
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
1,
12
(2019),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/201905/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4BSY-4YPS].
FinCEN’s oversight is important to protect against money laundering and the funding of criminal
activities as well as to ensure compliance with international standards. International anti-money
laundering (“AML”) standards are set out by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”). The FATF
revised its standards to include Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (the “Standards”)
in 2019. FATF, GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH: VIRTUAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL ASSET
SERVICE
PROVIDERS
4
(2019),
https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/RBA-VA-VASPs.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7UGTDBS]. It then published a second annual review of the implementation of the Standards in July
2021. FATF, SECOND 12-MONTH REVIEW OF THE REVISED FATF STANDARDS ON VIRTUAL
ASSETS AND VIRTUAL ASSET SERVICE PROVIDERS 2 (2021), https://www.fatf-
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However, because there have been no exchanges focused on currencies
in the way that some crypto exchanges currently operate, either a new agency
would need to be created to regulate exchanges focused on transactions in
currency tokens, or an existing agency would need to be tasked with this
responsibility. The CFTC has a reasonable approach to markets in which
futures are traded (which is the scope of its current power), requiring any
such exchanges (called designated contract markets) to operate in compliance
with overarching principles designed to adequately protect market
participants.264
The Chair of the CFTC has recently asked for expanded authority,265
and while this would necessarily expand the agency’s traditional role, the
CFTC has already demonstrated a measured but firm response to exchanges
trading in crypto derivatives.266 For example, the CFTC has been overseeing
trading in Bitcoin (and other crypto) futures since 2017.267 The first Bitcoin
Futures Exchange Traded Fund (“ETF”) was not approved by the SEC until
October 2021, but the fact that the SEC allowed listing of that ETF on a
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Second-12-Month-Review-Revised-FATFStandards-Virtual-Assets-VASPS.pdf. Most recently, FATF issued an updated guidance report.
FATF, UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH: VIRTUAL ASSETS AND VIRTUAL
ASSET
SERVICE
PROVIDERS
(2021),
https://www.fatfgafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/guidance-rba-virtual-assets-2021.html.
264. The CFTC has twenty-three core principles. Core Principles and Other Requirements for
Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,612 (June 19, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
1,
16,
38),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/201212746a.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHC3-DQ67].
265. Rostin Behnam, the acting head of the CFTC, called on Congress to expand the authority
of the CFTC over cryptoassets in October 2021. See, e.g., Paul Kiernan, CFTC Chief Says Recent
Crypto Cases Are ‘Tip of the Iceberg’, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2021, 5:32 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-chief-says-recent-crypto-cases-are-tip-of-the-iceberg11635370374; see also Gura, supra note 233 (noting that during Behnam’s confirmation hearing
before the Senate Agriculture Committee, he suggested the CFTC “should have a bigger role in
regulation, even as he acknowledged it would ‘be a departure from our historical role as a derivatives
regulator’”).
266. The self-certification process followed by designated contract markets under the CFTC’s
jurisdiction allows for crypto products to be offered without unreasonable delays. See CFTC, CFTC
BACKGROUNDER
ON
SELF-CERTIFIED
CONTRACTS
FOR
BITCOIN
PRODUCTS,
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/bitcoin_fact
sheet120117.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP23-M4R5] (noting that on “December 1, 2017, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc. (CME) and the CBOE Futures Exchange (CFE) self-certified new
contracts for bitcoin futures products and the Cantor Exchange self-certified a new contract for
bitcoin binary options”).
267. “In 2018, [CFTC Chairman Chris] Giancarlo did the unthinkable and approved bitcoin
futures trading. More specifically, he allowed CME Group and C[BOE] Global Markets to ‘selfcertify’ these products. In 2019, then-Chairman Heath Tarbert declared that ETH is a commodity.
A year later ErisX, a cryptocurrency derivatives platform, launched the first ether futures contract.”
Daniel Kuhn, The CFTC Was Proved Right on Bitcoin Futures. What’s Next for the Agency?,
COINDESK (Oct. 22, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/10/19/the-cftc-wasproved-right-on-bitcoin-futures-whats-next-for-the-agency/.
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regulated securities exchange indicates that the SEC has a reasonable level
of confidence in the CFTC’s regulatory approach.268 Giving the CFTC
authority (and the necessary resources to appropriately oversee
implementation of, and compliance with, applicable standards) could close a
potential loophole in existing regulations and remove an apparent
explanation for part of the SEC’s continual overreaching to regulate virtually
all cryptoassets as securities. This could also help create a framework within
which stablecoins could be regulated, which seems to be a priority for
regulators and legislators at this time.269
D. Security Tokens
Securities tokens would be another potential category of cryptoassets.270
As suggested here, this group of cryptoassets would not only include
anything issued as a tokenized version of a conventional security,271 marketed
as a speculative investment,272 or denominated as a securities token,273 but
also cryptoassets sold where there is a reasonable likelihood that a substantial
majority of purchasers are acquiring them in the hopes of appreciation based
268. Hassan Maishera, US SEC Finally Approves a Crypto ETF. But It Is a Bitcoin Futures ETF,
YAHOO
(Oct.
18,
2021),
https://www.yahoo.com/now/us-sec-finally-approves-crypto105924679.html [https://perma.cc/C44M-KX2W]. If the SEC did not agree that the CFTC’s
approach to regulating futures exchanges meant that they are sufficiently free of manipulation and
abuse, it could not have approved trading of the Bitcoin Futures ETF on a securities exchange.
269. See, e.g., STABLECOIN REPORT, supra note 191, at 2–3 (demonstrating government
agencies’ commitment to regulating stablecoins).
270. See Michael Jünemann & Johannes Wirtz, Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Kreditwesen 1117–
21, 1222–26 (2018), translated in ICO: Legal Classification of Tokens: Part 2—Security Token,
BIRD & BIRD 21–23 (May 27, 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2019/global/ico-legalclassification-of-tokens-2 [https://perma.cc/34XW-DR9A] (explaining an early consideration of
what kinds of assets could be classified as security tokens).
271. As used here, a tokenized security is a conventional debt or equity interest that would be
recognized as a security absent any consideration of blockchain technology, where ownership of the
interest is registered through distributed ledger technology. As explained elsewhere, “[a] tokenized
security can be equity, a bond or an investment fund.” Tokenized Securities, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/glossary/tokenized-securities
[https://perma.cc/AE3ZE4BL] (last visited Aug. 8, 2022).
272. This categorization is also consistent with Wyoming law, although it is formulated
differently. Wyoming law excludes digital consumer assets and virtual currency from the definition
of digital security. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-29-101(a)(iii) (2021). In a different section of the law,
adopted later, the statutes define open blockchain tokens as those that: have a predominant
consumptive purpose; are not marketed to the initial buyer as a financial investment; and are either
reasonably expected to have been sold for consumption, or could have been sold for consumption,
or cannot be resold until the consumptive purpose is available, or there are other reasonable
precautions to prevent purchasers from buying as a financial investment. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3429-106(b) (2019) (including a comment in the codified version that that section should probably
cross-reference to § 34-29-101(a)).
273. This would track one of the current categories of items included as a security under the
federal securities laws. Section 2 of the ‘33 Act specifically includes as a security “any interest or
instrument commonly known as a ‘security.’” Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
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on something other than market forces (including any implicit promises or
expectation of efforts from the issuer or others associated with it). The
concept of a securities token would therefore include any pre-functional
token where funding is being sought, at least in part, to develop a network,
the token itself, or the token’s functionality,274 because purchasers of the prefunctional interest would be relying on the issuer to finish developing the
anticipated functionality.
Securities tokens would need to be sold in compliance with an existing
exemption275 or pursuant to a registration statement under the federal
securities laws.276 Ideally, as has been explored in more detail elsewhere, the
disclosures required for deals involving cryptoassets could (and should) be
tailored to those kinds of interests.277
In addition, in order to rein in overly-aggressive enforcement by the
SEC, Congress should also consider a statute of limitations on enforcement
actions based on a failure to register a security token.278 A two-year statute
of limitations after the SEC becomes aware of the facts that would justify
bringing such an enforcement action would parallel the statute of limitations
for private claims,279 and the period could be tolled for pending
administrative actions, which would still give issuers reasonable notice of the
SEC’s position.

274. Because, in this case, there is no functional token being sold, traditional investment contract
analysis should work well, as described in the SAFT documentation. See SAFT Whitepaper, supra
note 87, at 1. Regardless of whether the purchasers are buying contractual rights to acquire tokens
when issued or incomplete items, because there is no ambiguity about application of the securities
laws in this particular context, there is no need to abandon the conclusions called for by the
traditional Howey test here. Id. at 4–5 (pre-functional tokens), 16 (contractual rights) (explaining
why the sale of such interests involves securities).
275. Most current exemptions from registration (as opposed to transactional exemptions) are
found in Section 4 of the ‘33 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
276. The registration requirement is found in Section 5 of the ‘33 Act. Securities Act of 1933 §
5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
277. E.g., Carol R. Goforth, Using Cybersecurity Failures to Critique the SEC’s Approach to
Crypto Regulation, 65 S.D. L. REV. 433, 447 (2020).
278. SEC v. Ripple, which was brought more than seven years after Ripple first began selling the
XRP token, is a case in point illustrating the need for a limitation on the SEC’s power to initiate
actions long after the complained-of behavior has occurred. See supra Section III.C. (discussing the
Ripple case). The perceived unfairness of an enforcement action brought so many years after the
conduct began has been highlighted by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 171.
It has also led to ongoing litigation seeking to curb the SEC’s activity. See supra notes 167–169.
279. This suggestion has also been made by the author of this paper before. See Roslyn Layton,
Toward a Ripple Test at the SEC, FORBES (July 22, 2021, 6:35 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2021/07/22/toward-a-ripple-test-at-thesec/?sh=503334b92e67 (“Goforth notes the following conditions which would exempt the asset
from registration . . . a 2 year statute of limitations on litigation over a company’s failure to register
. . . .”).
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If Congress does decide to move forward, it would also be useful to
minimize duplicative regulation by preempting inconsistent state
regulation.280 The SEC might also be encouraged to clarify its rules on
integration of offerings.281
The SEC would thus have regulatory authority over securities tokens
(including pre-functional utility tokens), as well as enforcement authority
over fraudulent or manipulative behavior in connection with the sale of any
type of token, as described earlier.282 This leaves the question of who should
have regulatory authority over functional utility tokens.
E. Utility Tokens
As used in this Article, the term “utility tokens” refers to fully functional
cryptoassets that would not be classified as securities tokens, but which
possess one or more significant functions other than those associated with
fiat currency.283 Certainly, the original SAFT proponents hoped that these
utility tokens would be beyond the purview of federal regulations such as
those enforced by the SEC.284 Given the SEC’s insistence that utility tokens
are within its authority and need to be regulated, a reasonable compromise
might be to allow the SEC to use its enforcement power over fraud to protect
purchasers who acquire utility tokens, without triggering the full panoply of
registration requirements when these assets are sold by their creators.

280. Preemption of state securities laws has also been discussed before. See Roberta S. Karmel,
Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe,
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 499 (2003) (noting that “Congress has frequently preempted state law,
particularly in the area of financial regulation”). One of Karmel’s conclusions is that “much state
securities regulation over the years has been duplicative, unnecessarily burdensome, and expensive
for the securities industry, without adding sufficient value in terms of investor protection. Also, state
securities regulation is uneven from state to state and even from administration to administration
within a particular state.” Id. at 544.
281. See supra notes 117–125 and accompanying text (describing some of the open questions
left by the most recent amendments to the integration rules).
282. See supra Section V.B.
283. See Michael Jünemann & Johannes Wirtz, Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Kreditwesen 1117–
21, 1222–26 (2018), translated in ICO: Legal Classification of Tokens: Part 4—Utility Token 21–
23 BIRD & BIRD (June 2, 2019), https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2019/global/ico-legalclassification-of-tokens-utility-token [https://perma.cc/4B32-XTJQ] (explaining an early
consideration of what kinds of assets could be classified as utility tokens). Their suggestion was that
utility tokens “are a type of digital voucher for goods or services,” where the issuer pledges to
provide goods or services when the token is redeemed. Id. Note that not all functionality outside the
kinds of utility provided by conventional currency would place a token into this category. A token
could be designed to replace a traditional equity or debt security, and thus be different than a
traditional cryptocurrency. However, that functionality would result in the creation of a securities
token, not a utility token. See supra notes 270–273 and accompanying text for an explanation of
security tokens.
284. SAFT WHITEPAPER, supra note 87, at 1.

158

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:107

Alternatively, regulatory authority over utility tokens could be passed to
the CFTC. This would require a change in the CFTC’s general authority, as
otherwise it would be limited to handling fraud in the spot markets,285 which
is already within the SEC’s jurisdiction. If the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission was to become the Commodity and Futures Trading
Commission, it could be given explicit regulatory authority over exchanges
on which utility tokens might be traded.
There are benefits to this approach. This would mean that utility tokens
could be traded on exchanges operating under the CFTC’s jurisdiction, so
long as the interests are traded in a way consistent with the CFTC’s
principles. As described earlier in connection with the discussion of currency
tokens,286 this means that exchanges are likely to be able to expeditiously
proceed with the listing of utility tokens so long as they make sure that their
exchanges are organized in compliance with CFTC standards. There are no
built-in delays like those that would be imposed before a trading exchange
could be approved by the SEC.287
CONCLUSION
This Article sets out to demonstrate that the SEC is currently on a path
that amounts to regulation by enforcement. Despite protestations to the
contrary arguing that the definition of a security in the context of cryptoassets
is clear,288 the reality suggests a great deal of confusion and uncertainty.289
Inconsistent and uncertain enforcement of the securities laws in the context
of cryptoassets, coupled with a lack of definitive, precedential case law
backing up the SEC’s interpretation of its jurisdiction, has led to a situation
where crypto entrepreneurs are not certain about when the securities laws
apply or what they require. As a result, some crypto entrepreneurs have
moved away from the United States, not only diminishing the pool of talent
operating here, but also depriving Americans of the opportunity to participate
285. Most of the CFTC’s enforcement activities in the crypto space have involved combatting
fraud in the crypto ecosystem. Kuhn, supra note 267 (noting that historically the CFTC’s crypto
“[i]nvestigations were limited to pretty clear, identifiable, fraudulent schemes; businesses that failed
to register with the CFTC; illegal off-exchange transactions; gatekeepers and price manipulators”).
286. See supra Section V.C.
287. See Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Statement, In the Matter of Poloniex, LLC (Aug. 9,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/pierce-statement-poloniex-080921
[https://perma.cc/295P-TM2Q] (expressing concern about such delays and noting that “the
Commission was moving very cautiously with respect to regulated entities’ engagement with crypto
assets,” and that if Poloniex had tried to register its exchange “it likely would have waited . . . and
waited . . . and waited some more” (ellipses in original)).
288. See Bradley, supra note 2, quoting SEC Chairman Gensler as having claimed that the
“broad” definition of “security” gave the SEC “great deal of authority . . . a great deal of clarity”
over the crypto markets; see also supra note 174.
289. See, e.g., supra notes 73–74, 80–82, 126–127 and accompanying text.
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in potentially valuable opportunities that are available to others.290 Finally,
because the SEC is now asserting that it has clear and broad authority in the
crypto system, it is unclear how apparent holes in the existing regulatory
structure are going to be filled.
Given that there is no indication that the SEC has any intention of
changing its direction, the best chance to resolve the existing issues is through
congressional intervention. This Article suggests that there is a great need for
consistent terminology and classification of cryptoassets,291 and that clearer
areas of primary responsibility for federal agencies would be desirable. 292
The suggestions offered here provide some possible options that might result
in a change of direction in line with these objectives.

290. See supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part V.B.
292. The need for consistent approaches to different kinds of cryptoassets is discussed
throughout supra Part V.

